David Kiefer
Macroeconomic Policy and Public Choice (eBook, PDF)
73,95 €
73,95 €
inkl. MwSt.
Sofort per Download lieferbar
37 °P sammeln
73,95 €
Als Download kaufen
73,95 €
inkl. MwSt.
Sofort per Download lieferbar
37 °P sammeln
Jetzt verschenken
Alle Infos zum eBook verschenken
73,95 €
inkl. MwSt.
Sofort per Download lieferbar
Alle Infos zum eBook verschenken
37 °P sammeln
David Kiefer
Macroeconomic Policy and Public Choice (eBook, PDF)
- Format: PDF
- Merkliste
- Auf die Merkliste
- Bewerten Bewerten
- Teilen
- Produkt teilen
- Produkterinnerung
- Produkterinnerung
Bitte loggen Sie sich zunächst in Ihr Kundenkonto ein oder registrieren Sie sich bei
bücher.de, um das eBook-Abo tolino select nutzen zu können.
Hier können Sie sich einloggen
Hier können Sie sich einloggen
Sie sind bereits eingeloggt. Klicken Sie auf 2. tolino select Abo, um fortzufahren.
Bitte loggen Sie sich zunächst in Ihr Kundenkonto ein oder registrieren Sie sich bei bücher.de, um das eBook-Abo tolino select nutzen zu können.
This book considers the connections between macroeconomics and government politics. The central idea is the existence of a political economic equilibrium in which the government acts to dampen the business cycle. Special attention is given to relevant data and to the possibility of hypothesis testing. This is a revised and extended study edition that is updated to include topics such as political business cycles, government debt, and deficit and social security.
- Geräte: PC
- ohne Kopierschutz
- eBook Hilfe
- Größe: 30.43MB
Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
- Franco NardiniTechnical Progress and Economic Growth (eBook, PDF)40,95 €
- -45%11Farrokh K. LangdanaMacroeconomic Policy (eBook, PDF)65,95 €
- Fernando De Holanda BarbosaMacroeconomic Theory (eBook, PDF)69,95 €
- Fernando De Holanda BarbosaMacroeconomic Theory (eBook, PDF)81,95 €
- Kamran DadkhahThe Evolution of Macroeconomic Theory and Policy (eBook, PDF)57,95 €
- David E. LindseyA Century of Monetary Policy at the Fed (eBook, PDF)89,95 €
- Italian Institutional Reforms: A Public Choice Perspective (eBook, PDF)73,95 €
-
-
-
This book considers the connections between macroeconomics and government politics. The central idea is the existence of a political economic equilibrium in which the government acts to dampen the business cycle. Special attention is given to relevant data and to the possibility of hypothesis testing. This is a revised and extended study edition that is updated to include topics such as political business cycles, government debt, and deficit and social security.
Dieser Download kann aus rechtlichen Gründen nur mit Rechnungsadresse in A, B, BG, CY, CZ, D, DK, EW, E, FIN, F, GR, HR, H, IRL, I, LT, L, LR, M, NL, PL, P, R, S, SLO, SK ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
- Seitenzahl: 275
- Erscheinungstermin: 6. Dezember 2012
- Englisch
- ISBN-13: 9783642605642
- Artikelnr.: 53092754
- Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
- Seitenzahl: 275
- Erscheinungstermin: 6. Dezember 2012
- Englisch
- ISBN-13: 9783642605642
- Artikelnr.: 53092754
- Herstellerkennzeichnung Die Herstellerinformationen sind derzeit nicht verfügbar.
1. A Historical Introduction.- 1.1. The Keynesian revolution and the evolution of government's role.- 1.2. Keynesian orthodoxy.- 1.3. The political consequences of depression proofing.- 1.4. The economic consequences of depression proofing.- 1.5. Schools of thought.- 1.6. Ideology and politics.- 1.7. The market failure rationale for government intervention.- 1.8. Public choice.- 1.9. Conclusion.- 2. Microeconomic Foundations.- 2.1. Introduction.- 2.2. Consumers.- 2.3. Producers.- 2.4. General equilibrium.- 2.5. Pareto efficiency.- 2.6. Social welfare functions.- 2.7. Unemployment and inflation.- 2.8. The government budget and economic policy.- 2.9. Conclusion.- 3. Social Choice.- 3.1. Introduction.- 3.2. The theoretical superiority of majority rule.- 3.3. The impossibility of asking for more.- 3.4. Median voter model.- 3.5. Two dimensional social choice.- 3.6. Probabilistic voting.- 3.7. Political information and party ideology.- 3.8. Conclusion.- 4. Short-Run Macro Models.- 4.1. Introduction.- 4.2. Classical macro from micro foundations.- 4.3. Rationed equilibrium and rigid prices.- 4.4. Non-Walrasian equilibria.- 4.5. A Cobb-Douglas example.- 4.6. Conclusion.- 5. The Phillips Curve and Expectations.- 5.1. Introduction.- 5.2. The natural rate hypothesis.- 5.3. Unemployment and output gaps.- 5.4. Expectations about inflation in the future.- 5.5. Econometric uncertainty.- 5.6. One model of supply: Producer uncertainty.- 5.7. Another model: Predetermined wages.- 5.8. New classical macroeconomics.- 5.9. Conclusion.- 6. Fiscal and Monetary Policy.- 6.1. Introduction.- 6.2. Accounting peculiarities in the US budget.- 6.3. Built-in stabilizers.- 6.4. Balanced and unbalanced budgets.- 6.5. Doubts about fiscal policy effectiveness.- 6.6. The Federal Reserve and thePresident.- 6.7. Describing the money stock.- 6.8. Causality tests.- 6.9. Spurious regressions.- 6.10. Conclusion.- 7. Keynesian Business Cycles.- 7.1. Introduction.- 7.2. Cycles in a Keynesian model.- 7.3. A linear econometric model.- 7.4. Linear versus nonlinear models.- 7.5. Regression results.- 7.6. Econometric cautions.- 7.7. Dynamic behavior.- 7.8. Conclusion.- 8. Citizen Preferences.- 8.1. Introduction.- 8.2. Presidential popularity.- 8.3. Modeling popularity.- 8.4. Results.- 8.5. Conclusion.- 9. Endogenous Stabilization and Macroeconomic Ideology.- 9.1. Introduction.- 9.2. Endogenous stabilization policy.- 9.3. Ideology.- 9.4. Perceptions and expected utility.- 9.5. Plausible parameter values.- 9.6. The zero-inflation rule and inflation volatility.- 9.7. Voters should prefer conservatives, under certain conditions.- 9.8. Uncertainty about candidate platforms.- 9.9. Conclusion.- 10. Political Business Cycles.- 10.1. Introduction.- 10.2. Election opportunism.- 10.3. Partisan macroeconomics.- 10.4. Backward looking expectations.- 10.5. Forward looking expectations.- 10.6. Observations.- 10.7. Regression tests.- 10.8. Growth rate targets.- 10.9. Conclusion.- 11. Government Debt, Deficit and Social Security.- 11.1. Public debt in the short and long-run.- 11.2. Overlapping generations and efficiency.- 11.3. Public debt.- 11.4. Pay-as-you-go social security.- 11.5. Overlapping generations and equity.- 11.6. Market imperfections in the credit market.- 11.7. The Ricardian equivalence theorem.- 11.8. Illusions, inertia and irrationalities.- 11.9. Economic growth and the bequest constraint.- 11.10. Social security.- 11.11. Conclusion.- Appendix: More overlapping scenarios.- 12. Conclusion.- 12.1. The Keynesian revolution.- 12.2. Foundations.- 12.3. Weak evidence of policyeffectiveness.- 12.4. Rational expectations and the Phillips curve.- 12.5. An inherently unstable equilibrium.- 12.6. Stabilization and conservatism.- 12.7. Doubts about rational expectations.- 12.8. Long-run Keynesian outcomes.- References 241.- Subject Index 249.
1. A Historical Introduction.- 1.1. The Keynesian revolution and the evolution of government's role.- 1.2. Keynesian orthodoxy.- 1.3. The political consequences of depression proofing.- 1.4. The economic consequences of depression proofing.- 1.5. Schools of thought.- 1.6. Ideology and politics.- 1.7. The market failure rationale for government intervention.- 1.8. Public choice.- 1.9. Conclusion.- 2. Microeconomic Foundations.- 2.1. Introduction.- 2.2. Consumers.- 2.3. Producers.- 2.4. General equilibrium.- 2.5. Pareto efficiency.- 2.6. Social welfare functions.- 2.7. Unemployment and inflation.- 2.8. The government budget and economic policy.- 2.9. Conclusion.- 3. Social Choice.- 3.1. Introduction.- 3.2. The theoretical superiority of majority rule.- 3.3. The impossibility of asking for more.- 3.4. Median voter model.- 3.5. Two dimensional social choice.- 3.6. Probabilistic voting.- 3.7. Political information and party ideology.- 3.8. Conclusion.- 4. Short-Run Macro Models.- 4.1. Introduction.- 4.2. Classical macro from micro foundations.- 4.3. Rationed equilibrium and rigid prices.- 4.4. Non-Walrasian equilibria.- 4.5. A Cobb-Douglas example.- 4.6. Conclusion.- 5. The Phillips Curve and Expectations.- 5.1. Introduction.- 5.2. The natural rate hypothesis.- 5.3. Unemployment and output gaps.- 5.4. Expectations about inflation in the future.- 5.5. Econometric uncertainty.- 5.6. One model of supply: Producer uncertainty.- 5.7. Another model: Predetermined wages.- 5.8. New classical macroeconomics.- 5.9. Conclusion.- 6. Fiscal and Monetary Policy.- 6.1. Introduction.- 6.2. Accounting peculiarities in the US budget.- 6.3. Built-in stabilizers.- 6.4. Balanced and unbalanced budgets.- 6.5. Doubts about fiscal policy effectiveness.- 6.6. The Federal Reserve and thePresident.- 6.7. Describing the money stock.- 6.8. Causality tests.- 6.9. Spurious regressions.- 6.10. Conclusion.- 7. Keynesian Business Cycles.- 7.1. Introduction.- 7.2. Cycles in a Keynesian model.- 7.3. A linear econometric model.- 7.4. Linear versus nonlinear models.- 7.5. Regression results.- 7.6. Econometric cautions.- 7.7. Dynamic behavior.- 7.8. Conclusion.- 8. Citizen Preferences.- 8.1. Introduction.- 8.2. Presidential popularity.- 8.3. Modeling popularity.- 8.4. Results.- 8.5. Conclusion.- 9. Endogenous Stabilization and Macroeconomic Ideology.- 9.1. Introduction.- 9.2. Endogenous stabilization policy.- 9.3. Ideology.- 9.4. Perceptions and expected utility.- 9.5. Plausible parameter values.- 9.6. The zero-inflation rule and inflation volatility.- 9.7. Voters should prefer conservatives, under certain conditions.- 9.8. Uncertainty about candidate platforms.- 9.9. Conclusion.- 10. Political Business Cycles.- 10.1. Introduction.- 10.2. Election opportunism.- 10.3. Partisan macroeconomics.- 10.4. Backward looking expectations.- 10.5. Forward looking expectations.- 10.6. Observations.- 10.7. Regression tests.- 10.8. Growth rate targets.- 10.9. Conclusion.- 11. Government Debt, Deficit and Social Security.- 11.1. Public debt in the short and long-run.- 11.2. Overlapping generations and efficiency.- 11.3. Public debt.- 11.4. Pay-as-you-go social security.- 11.5. Overlapping generations and equity.- 11.6. Market imperfections in the credit market.- 11.7. The Ricardian equivalence theorem.- 11.8. Illusions, inertia and irrationalities.- 11.9. Economic growth and the bequest constraint.- 11.10. Social security.- 11.11. Conclusion.- Appendix: More overlapping scenarios.- 12. Conclusion.- 12.1. The Keynesian revolution.- 12.2. Foundations.- 12.3. Weak evidence of policyeffectiveness.- 12.4. Rational expectations and the Phillips curve.- 12.5. An inherently unstable equilibrium.- 12.6. Stabilization and conservatism.- 12.7. Doubts about rational expectations.- 12.8. Long-run Keynesian outcomes.- References 241.- Subject Index 249.