Richard Double

Metaethical Subjectivism (eBook, ePUB)

• Format: ePub

Produktbeschreibung

In this accessible book, Richard Double, presents a vigorous defence of metaethical subjectivism, arguing that the acceptance of this doctrine need have no deleterious effects upon theorizing either in normative ethics or in moral practice. Proceeding from a 'worldview' methodology Double criticizes the rival doctrine of metaethical objectivism for lacking both 'completeness' and 'soundness' , argues that a defence of metaethical subjectivism requires no special semantic analysis of moral language and defends the plausibility of metaethical subjectivism as explaining key intractable disagreements in moral philosophy.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Taylor & Francis
• Seitenzahl: 138
• Erscheinungstermin: 2. März 2017
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781351918046
• Artikelnr.: 49377818

Autorenporträt

Dr Richard Double has written The Non-Reality of Free Will, Metaphilosophy and Free Will, and Beginning Philosophy. He has also written over 50 articles and 20 reviews. Upon retirement he was full professor of philosophy and chair at Edinboro University of Pennsylvania, and voted University Researcher of the Year for 2003-04.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents: Metaethical subjectivism and metaethical objectivism
Requirements for metaethically objective moral theories
What metaethical subjectivism does not need to provide
Moral intuitions
Impartiality
Partiality
Maximization troubles for all moral theories
The fragmentation of the moral
Moral practice, normative ethics, and metaethical subjectivism
Notes
References
Index.