Oisín Deery

Naturally Free Action (eBook, PDF)

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

In Naturally Free Action, Ois?n Deery argues that free will exists, where free will is understood as the ability to act freely, and free actions as exercises of that ability. Deery reaches his conclusion by showing how the concept of free will plausibly refers to many actual human behaviors, and how these behaviors count as a natural category or kind. Deery also addresses the role of phenomenology in fixing the reference of the concept, arguing that our phenomenology as of deciding or acting freely is typically accurate, even if determinism is true. The result is a realist, naturalistic framework for theorizing about free will, according to which free will almost certainly exists and we act freely. Deery's position mostly sidesteps the question of whether free will is compatible with determinism. Even so, Deery maintains that his natural-kind view about free will supports compatibilism and provides compatibilists with an attractive way to be realists about free will. Deery also responds to recent empirical threats to free will, including those posed by findings about behaviors caused by implicit biases. Finally, Deery shows how his view possesses the resources to address emerging questions about whether artificially intelligent agents might ever act freely or be responsible for their behaviors, and if so in what sense.

---

Dieser Download kann aus rechtlichen Gründen nur mit Rechnungsadresse in A, B, BG, CY, CZ, D, DK, EW, E, FIN, F, GR, HR, H, IRL, I, LT, L, LR, M, NL, PL, P, R, S, SLO, SK ausgeliefert werden.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Oxford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 224
• Erscheinungstermin: 15. April 2021
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9780192507006
• Artikelnr.: 61763587

Autorenporträt

Oisín Deery is a continuing Lecturer and ARC DECRA Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, and also Assistant Professor of Philosophy at York University, Toronto. His research interests lie at the intersection of philosophy of mind and action, metaphysics, and ethics. He also works on issues related to artificial intelligence. He attended the National University of Ireland, Galway (BA), University College Cork (MA), and the University of British Columbia (PhD). He has previously taught at Monash University, Florida State University, and the University of Arizona, and he held a postdoctoral research position at the Université de Montréal.

Inhaltsangabe

Introduction
Part 1: Concept and Reference
1: Methodology and free will
2: Naturally free action
3: Reference, error, naturalism
Part 2: Phenomenology
4: Is free-agency phenomenology accurate?
5: Preserving preservationism (about free will)
6: Free-agency experience and belief
Conclusion