Martin Peterson

Non-Bayesian Decision Theory (eBook, PDF)

Beliefs and Desires as Reasons for Action

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

This book aims to present an account of rational choice from a non-Bayesian point of view. Rational agents maximize subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, the author argues that utility and subjective probability should not be defined in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. To some extent, the author's non-Bayesian view gives a modern account of what decision theory could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, Savage, and Jeffrey. The author argues that traditional Bayesian decision theory is unavailing from an action-guiding perspective. For the deliberating Bayesian agent, the output of decision theory is not a set of preferences over alternative acts - these preferences are on the contrary used as input to the theory. Instead, the output is a (set of) utility function(s) that can be used for describing the agent as an expected utility maximizer, which are of limited normative relevance.On the non-Bayesian view articulated by the author, utility and probability are defined in terms of preferences over certain outcomes. These utility and probability functions are then used for generating preferences over uncertain prospects, which conform to the principle of maximizing expected utility. It is argued that this approach offers more action guidance.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Springer Netherlands
• Seitenzahl: 170
• Erscheinungstermin: 6. Juni 2008
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781402086991
• Artikelnr.: 37344634

Autorenporträt

Martin Peterson received his PhD in philosophy in 2003 from the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm. He is currently an associate professor of philosophy at Eindhoven University of Technology. Between 2005 and 2008 he worked for three years at the University of Cambridge, where he was a Research Fellow in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science and Director of Studies in Philosophy at St Edmund's College. He has also held teaching and research positions at the Royal Institute of Technology and at Lulea University of Technology.

Inhaltsangabe

Bayesian decision theory.- Choosing what to decide.- Indeterminate preferences.- Utility.- Subjective probability.- Expected utility.- Risk aversion.

Rezensionen

From the reviews: "This book presents an account of rational choice from a non-Bayesian point of view. ... this book argues that the non-Bayesian approach offers more action guidance to the decision maker. ... the book is well addressed to all researchers in the field of decision theory, and especially those with philosophical concerns." (Vangelis Grigoroudis, Zentralblatt MATH, Vol. 1151, 2009)