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Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind presents cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind, combining invited articles and articles selected from submissions. Each volume will highlight two themes to bring focus to debates. The series will reflect the diversity of methods adopted in contemporary philosophy of mind and provide a venue for rigorous and innovative work by both established and up-and-coming voices in the field. The themes covered in the third volume are mind and science, sensory experience, and the philosophy of mind of Margaret Cavendish and C.A. Strong. It also contains a book…mehr
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind presents cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind, combining invited articles and articles selected from submissions. Each volume will highlight two themes to bring focus to debates. The series will reflect the diversity of methods adopted in contemporary philosophy of mind and provide a venue for rigorous and innovative work by both established and up-and-coming voices in the field. The themes covered in the third volume are mind and science, sensory experience, and the philosophy of mind of Margaret Cavendish and C.A. Strong. It also contains a book symposium on David Papineau's The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience.
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Autorenporträt
Uriah Kriegel is Professor of Philosophy at Rice University. He is the author of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory (OUP, 2009), The Sources of Intentionality (OUP, 2011), The Varieties of Consciousness (OUP, 2015), and Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value (OUP, 2018).
Inhaltsangabe
* I. Mind and Science * 1: Sara Aronowitz: The Parts of an Imperfect Agent * 2: Henry Cowles and Joshua Knobe: The Average isn't Normal * 3: Gabriel Dupre: Correspondence and Construction: The Representational Theory of Mind and Internally-Driven Classificatory Schemes * 4: Gabbrielle Johnson: Bias and the Domain of Consciousness * 5: Preston Lennon: Aphantasia and Conscious Thought * 6: Maja Spener: The Introspective Method * II. Sensory Experience: Perception, Imagination, Pleasure * 7: Dorothea Debus: Right Here, Right Now: On the Eudaimonic Value of Perceptual Awareness * 8: Justin D'Amrbosio and Daniel Stoljar: Imagination, Fiction, and Perspectival Displacement * 9: Daniel Pallies and Alexander Dietz: The Dilemma for Attitude Theories of Pleasure * 10: Davide Bordini: Seeing through Transparency * III. Book Symposium on David Papineau s The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience * 11: David Papineau: Précis of The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience * 12: Alex Byrne: Papineau on Sensory Experience * 13: Angela Mendelovici: Truth and Content in Sensory Experience * 14: Adam Pautz: An Argument Against Papineau s Qualitative View of Sensory Experience * 15: David Papineau: Responses to Mendelovici, Pautz and Byrne * IV. History of Philosophy of Mind: Cavendish and Strong * 16: David Cunning: Cavendish and Strawson on Emergence, Mind, and Self * 17: Alison Peterman: 'Actions of a Body Sentient': Cavendish on the Mind (and against Panpsychism) * 18: Galen Strawson: C. A. Strong: Real Materialism, Evolutionary Naturalism, Panpsychism
* I. Mind and Science * 1: Sara Aronowitz: The Parts of an Imperfect Agent * 2: Henry Cowles and Joshua Knobe: The Average isn't Normal * 3: Gabriel Dupre: Correspondence and Construction: The Representational Theory of Mind and Internally-Driven Classificatory Schemes * 4: Gabbrielle Johnson: Bias and the Domain of Consciousness * 5: Preston Lennon: Aphantasia and Conscious Thought * 6: Maja Spener: The Introspective Method * II. Sensory Experience: Perception, Imagination, Pleasure * 7: Dorothea Debus: Right Here, Right Now: On the Eudaimonic Value of Perceptual Awareness * 8: Justin D'Amrbosio and Daniel Stoljar: Imagination, Fiction, and Perspectival Displacement * 9: Daniel Pallies and Alexander Dietz: The Dilemma for Attitude Theories of Pleasure * 10: Davide Bordini: Seeing through Transparency * III. Book Symposium on David Papineau s The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience * 11: David Papineau: Précis of The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience * 12: Alex Byrne: Papineau on Sensory Experience * 13: Angela Mendelovici: Truth and Content in Sensory Experience * 14: Adam Pautz: An Argument Against Papineau s Qualitative View of Sensory Experience * 15: David Papineau: Responses to Mendelovici, Pautz and Byrne * IV. History of Philosophy of Mind: Cavendish and Strong * 16: David Cunning: Cavendish and Strawson on Emergence, Mind, and Self * 17: Alison Peterman: 'Actions of a Body Sentient': Cavendish on the Mind (and against Panpsychism) * 18: Galen Strawson: C. A. Strong: Real Materialism, Evolutionary Naturalism, Panpsychism
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