Torin Alter, Sven Walter

Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge (eBook, PDF)

New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for the view that the mind is physical. This volume collects thirteen new papers on this problem by leading philosophers including Torin Alter, Ned Block, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, John Hawthorne, Frank Jackson, Janet Levin, Joseph Levine, Martine Nida-R"umelin, Laurence Nemirow, Knut Nordby, David Papineau, and Stephen White.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Oxford University Press
• Erscheinungstermin: 14. Dezember 2006
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9780198038306
• Artikelnr.: 38127681

Autorenporträt

Torin Alter is Associate Professor at the University of Alabama. Sven Walter is Assistant Professor at the University of Bielefeld, Germany.

Inhaltsangabe

* Introduction
* Part 1: Phenomenal Knowledge
* 1: Daniel Dennet, Tufts University: What RoboMary Knows
* 2: Laurence Nemirow, Davis Graham and Stubbs Income Tax, Benefits and
Estate Group: So This is What it's Like: a Defense of the Ability
Hypothesis
* 3: Frank Jackson, Australian National University, British Academy,
Australian Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, and Fand
Institut International de Philosophie: The Knowledge Argument,
Diaphanousness, Representationalism
* 4: Torin Alter, The University of Alabama: Does Representationalism
Undermine the Knowledge Argument?
* 5: Knut Nordby, formerly University of Oslo and Telnor
Communications, Research and Development: What is This Thing You Call
Color: Can a Totally Color-Blind Person Know about Color?
* Part 2: Phenomenal Concepts
* 6: Janet Levin, University of Southern California: What is a
Phenomenal Concept?
* 7: David Papineau, King's College, Cambridge University: Phenomenal
and Perceptual Conepts
* 8: Joseph Levine, The University of Massachusetts at Amherst:
Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint
* 9: David Chalmers, Australian National University: Phenomenal
Concepts and the Explanatory Gap
* 10: John Hawthorne, Rutgers University: Direct Reference and Dancing
Qualia
* 11: Stephen White, Tufts University: Property Dualism, Phenomenal
Concepts, and the Semantic Premise
* 12: Ned Block, New York University: Max Black's Objection to
Mind-Brain Identity
* 13: Martine Nida-R:umelin, University of Fribourg: Grasping
Phenomenal Properties