Vineeta Yadav

Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries (eBook, ePUB)

• Format: ePub

Produktbeschreibung

In Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries, Vineeta Yadav tackles the puzzle of corruption by analyzing the role that business lobbying plays in it. Combining focused studies of legislative institutions and business groups in India and Brazil with a broader survey of corruption in sixty-four developing democracies, Yadav shows how systems with powerful parties rather than ones with powerful individual legislators encourage the most corruption. A rigorous comparative examination of the connections between political institutions, lobbying, and corruption, this work will reshape our understanding of how developing democracies can both discourage and encourage bribery, vote buying, and influence peddling.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Oxford University Press
• Erscheinungstermin: 13. April 2011
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9780190453718
• Artikelnr.: 42675677

Autorenporträt

Vineeta Yadav is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University. She was a fellow at the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance at Princeton University and at the Kellogg Institute at the University of Notre Dame. Her research and teaching interests include business-government relations, special interest lobbying, legislative politics and economic development with a special focus on China, Brazil and, India.

Inhaltsangabe

Acknowledgements
1 Introduction
2 Institutions, Lobbying and Corruption: A Theoretical Framework
3 Case Studies: Legislative Institutions in Brazil and India
4 Brazil and India: Legislative Institutions and Lobbying Behavior
5 Brazil and India: Business Lobbying and Corruption
6 Institutions, Party Control and Corruption: The Empirical Evidence
7 Conclusion
References
Appendix