Sarah E. Anderson, Daniel M. Butler, Laurel Harbridge-Yong

Rejecting Compromise (eBook, PDF)

Legislators'' Fear of Primary Voters

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

This analysis of legislative behavior shows how primary voters can obstruct political compromise and outlines potential reforms to remedy gridlock.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Erscheinungstermin: 20. Februar 2020
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781108851664
• Artikelnr.: 70910901

Autorenporträt

Sarah E. Anderson is an Associate Professor of environmental politics at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Her research examines how legislature and bureaucracy shape policy. She has previously worked as a legislative assistant for a member of Congress.

Inhaltsangabe

1. Rejecting compromise, getting gridlock
2. Legislators reject half-loaf compromises
3. Legislators reject half-loaf compromises because they fear voter retribution
4. Primary voters as the source of punishment
5. Voter punishment is rare but real
6. Structuring negotiations in the shadow of primary voter punishment
7. Compromise, voter punishment in primaries, and legislative gridlock
References.