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The question of how to properly enforce against RPM has been a contentious debate for decades on both sides of the Atlantic.
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The question of how to properly enforce against RPM has been a contentious debate for decades on both sides of the Atlantic.
Dieser Download kann aus rechtlichen Gründen nur mit Rechnungsadresse in A, B, BG, CY, CZ, D, DK, EW, E, FIN, F, GR, HR, H, IRL, I, LT, L, LR, M, NL, PL, P, R, S, SLO, SK ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis
- Seitenzahl: 440
- Erscheinungstermin: 31. März 2023
- Englisch
- ISBN-13: 9781000858501
- Artikelnr.: 67419459
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis
- Seitenzahl: 440
- Erscheinungstermin: 31. März 2023
- Englisch
- ISBN-13: 9781000858501
- Artikelnr.: 67419459
- Herstellerkennzeichnung Die Herstellerinformationen sind derzeit nicht verfügbar.
Dr. Christy L. Kollmar, Esq. has been a licensed practicing attorney in the United States since 2007 and is a member of the District of Columbia, Wyoming, Montana and Washington bars, including five federal court jurisdictions. After obtaining her Baccalaureate of Arts (BA) from University of Montana, a Juris Doctorate (JD) from Nova Southeastern University, a Master of Business Administration (MBA) from College of William & Mary, and a Master of Global Management (MGM) from Thunderbird School of Global Management, she relocated to Europe and attained a Master of Laws (LL.M.) from Riga Graduate School of Law and a Doctor of Philosophy in Law (Ph.D.) from University of Copenhagen.
Prior to her continued legal education, she served as a prosecuting attorney focused on drug and familial abuse crimes, followed by managing her own US federal and state-level criminal defense practice (Kollmar Law Office, PLLC.) focused on felony criminal litigation. Alongside of maintaining her criminal practice, Dr. Kollmar currently serves as a postdoctoral researcher at University of Copenhagen, Centre for Advanced Studies in Biomedical Innovation Law with a particular focus on comparative antitrust law and economics, where her academic portfolio comprises diverse supervision and lecturing in EU Law, Comparative Contracts, EU Competition Law and Economics, and Legal Research Methods.
Prior to her continued legal education, she served as a prosecuting attorney focused on drug and familial abuse crimes, followed by managing her own US federal and state-level criminal defense practice (Kollmar Law Office, PLLC.) focused on felony criminal litigation. Alongside of maintaining her criminal practice, Dr. Kollmar currently serves as a postdoctoral researcher at University of Copenhagen, Centre for Advanced Studies in Biomedical Innovation Law with a particular focus on comparative antitrust law and economics, where her academic portfolio comprises diverse supervision and lecturing in EU Law, Comparative Contracts, EU Competition Law and Economics, and Legal Research Methods.
Contents
Preface
List of Abbreviations
List of Annexes and Tables
Chapter 1 Introduction
Abstract
1. Topic Introduction
1. Background on Assessment and Application: Legal Issues and
Development
2. Background on Enforcement Best Practices: Investigative Techniques
and Enforcement Protocol
2. Research Objectives and Main Research Questions
3. Structure and Scope of Book
4. Conclusory Remarks
PART I - US HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS
Chapter 2 The Legal and Political Origins of RPM - United States
Abstract
5. United States: Historical Origins & Legal Structure of RPM
1. The Introduction of the Sherman Act and its Common Law Roots:
1889-1910
2. Dr. Miles Era- the Right of Alienation and its Per Se Impact:
1911-1930
3. Fair Trade Era- Carving out Exceptions to the Sherman Act: 1930-1975
4. Post Fair Trade Era- Non-Price vs. Price Transition Towards Rule of
Reason: 1975 - 2007
5. Leegin Era- Maximum vs. Minimum RPM Transition Towards Rule of
Reason: 2007 - Present
6. Chapter Conclusion: US Historical Origins and Legal Structure
Chapter 3 The Economics of Vertical Agreements - Background
Abstract
7. Chapter Introduction
1. General Economic Background of Vertical Restraints
2. General Economic Background of RPM
8. Background on Economic Theories of RPM
9. Link Between Schools of Thought and Economic Models
10. General Structure of Models: Vertical and Horizontal Elements of RPM
11. Digital Single Market, the E-Commerce Sector Inquiry and the Internet
1. Goals of the EC: Digital Single Market and E-Commerce Sector Inquiry
2. Models of Change: How the Internet Changed Market Dynamics
12. Conclusion: RPM Economic Background and E- Commerce
Chapter 4 The Economics of Vertical Agreements - Models
Abstract
13. Anti-Competitive vs. Pro-competitive Economic Models of RPM
14. Anti-Competitive RPM Theories
1. Facilitating Collusion Upstream or Downstream
2. Increase in Prices, Lifecycles and Product Favouritism
3. Foreclosure and Restriction of Entry Both Upstream and Downstream
4. Foreclosure as a Commitment Device in Protection of Monopoly Rents
5. Dampen or Soften Competition Both Upstream and Downstream
15. Pro-Competitive RPM Theories
1. Special Services and Free-riding
2. Quality Certification and Signalling
3. Image Theory: The Allure of Paying More
4. Demand Uncertainty and Inventories
5. Outlets and Distribution Density
6. Moral Hazard and Double Moral Hazard
7. Production of a Good when Manufacturers' Risks are Low
8. Contract Enforcement Mechanism and Quality Control
9. Loss Leader Selling
10. Less Efficient Dealer and/or Distributional Efficiency
11. Price Discrimination
12. Spatial Price Discrimination
13. Where imposing an RPM floor leads to a decrease in collusive
behaviour
14. RPM with Optimal Delegation
15. New Market Entry or Product Launch
16. Pro-competitive models which rely on the purely vertical aspect of
RPM
16. Conclusion: No Consensus among Economists on Impact of RPM
PART II - EU HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND LEGAL STRUCTURE
Chapter 5 The Legal and Political Origins of RPM - European Union
Abstract
17. European Union: Historical Origins & Legal Structure of RPM
18. Historical Background of EU Vertical Enforcement
19. Current Legal Structure of EU Vertical Enforcement
1. Block Exemptions and their role in vertical restraint enforcement
2. Article 101(3): a closer examination of the individual assessment and
its role in vertical restraint enforcement
20. Chapter Conclusion: EU Historical Origins and Legal Structure
Chapter 6 The Legal Concepts of By-Object, By-Effect and Appreciability
Abstract
21. Introduction to the Distinction between By-Object and By-Effect
22. A Background on By-Object Restrictions: The Finer Details
23. Categorisation and Analysis of By-Object Restrictions: A Deeper Dive
1. By-Object Categorisation: Overview of Differences between the EC and
Case Law Approaches
2. By-Object Categorisation: Approaches to Appreciability
24. By-Effect Comparison: A Concise Overview of the Main Differences
25. Return to the RPM Legal Structure in light of the By-Object/By-Effect
Dichotomy: Overview of the Current Approach to RPM Enforcement
1. Article 101(3): a closer examination of the individual assessment and
its role in RPM enforcement
26. Chapter Conclusion
PART III - PROPOSALS, IMPLICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS
Chapter 7 Proposals and Solutions
Abstract
27. Chapter Introduction
28. Time for a Change? Transatlantic Synchrony towards Revealing a
Malfunctioning Regime
1. RPM Legal Regime: Current Challenges undermining its Efficacy
29. Horizontal Non-consensus: Should NCAs have their own agenda?
30. A New Way Forward: Developing a More Viable Approach to RPM Enforcement
31. Proposed RPM Solutions
1. Solution 1: Escaping automatic Article 101(3) TFEU applicability:
developing a mechanism where RPM can be found inappreciable, and
therefore, not in violation of Article 101(1) TFEU
2. Solution 2: Eliminate RPM's hardcore designation by shifting its
inclusion in the VBER from Article 4 to Article 5
3. Solution 3: Elimination of RPM's hardcore designation through its
application to Article 2 of the VBER (original and modified case
scenarios)
4. Solution 4: Application of the De Minimus Doctrine to RPM
5. Solution 5: Recommendations for Improvement of Status Quo
32. Chapter Conclusion
Chapter 8 Conclusion
Abstract
33. Conclusion: Most Serious Considerations to Enhance the Efficacy of the
Current RPM Regime
1. Overview of Solutions: The Best Way Forward
34. Final Remarks
Annex 1 RPM US Origins
Annex 2. RPM Economic Models
Annex 3. RPM Model Timeline
Index
Preface
List of Abbreviations
List of Annexes and Tables
Chapter 1 Introduction
Abstract
1. Topic Introduction
1. Background on Assessment and Application: Legal Issues and
Development
2. Background on Enforcement Best Practices: Investigative Techniques
and Enforcement Protocol
2. Research Objectives and Main Research Questions
3. Structure and Scope of Book
4. Conclusory Remarks
PART I - US HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS
Chapter 2 The Legal and Political Origins of RPM - United States
Abstract
5. United States: Historical Origins & Legal Structure of RPM
1. The Introduction of the Sherman Act and its Common Law Roots:
1889-1910
2. Dr. Miles Era- the Right of Alienation and its Per Se Impact:
1911-1930
3. Fair Trade Era- Carving out Exceptions to the Sherman Act: 1930-1975
4. Post Fair Trade Era- Non-Price vs. Price Transition Towards Rule of
Reason: 1975 - 2007
5. Leegin Era- Maximum vs. Minimum RPM Transition Towards Rule of
Reason: 2007 - Present
6. Chapter Conclusion: US Historical Origins and Legal Structure
Chapter 3 The Economics of Vertical Agreements - Background
Abstract
7. Chapter Introduction
1. General Economic Background of Vertical Restraints
2. General Economic Background of RPM
8. Background on Economic Theories of RPM
9. Link Between Schools of Thought and Economic Models
10. General Structure of Models: Vertical and Horizontal Elements of RPM
11. Digital Single Market, the E-Commerce Sector Inquiry and the Internet
1. Goals of the EC: Digital Single Market and E-Commerce Sector Inquiry
2. Models of Change: How the Internet Changed Market Dynamics
12. Conclusion: RPM Economic Background and E- Commerce
Chapter 4 The Economics of Vertical Agreements - Models
Abstract
13. Anti-Competitive vs. Pro-competitive Economic Models of RPM
14. Anti-Competitive RPM Theories
1. Facilitating Collusion Upstream or Downstream
2. Increase in Prices, Lifecycles and Product Favouritism
3. Foreclosure and Restriction of Entry Both Upstream and Downstream
4. Foreclosure as a Commitment Device in Protection of Monopoly Rents
5. Dampen or Soften Competition Both Upstream and Downstream
15. Pro-Competitive RPM Theories
1. Special Services and Free-riding
2. Quality Certification and Signalling
3. Image Theory: The Allure of Paying More
4. Demand Uncertainty and Inventories
5. Outlets and Distribution Density
6. Moral Hazard and Double Moral Hazard
7. Production of a Good when Manufacturers' Risks are Low
8. Contract Enforcement Mechanism and Quality Control
9. Loss Leader Selling
10. Less Efficient Dealer and/or Distributional Efficiency
11. Price Discrimination
12. Spatial Price Discrimination
13. Where imposing an RPM floor leads to a decrease in collusive
behaviour
14. RPM with Optimal Delegation
15. New Market Entry or Product Launch
16. Pro-competitive models which rely on the purely vertical aspect of
RPM
16. Conclusion: No Consensus among Economists on Impact of RPM
PART II - EU HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND LEGAL STRUCTURE
Chapter 5 The Legal and Political Origins of RPM - European Union
Abstract
17. European Union: Historical Origins & Legal Structure of RPM
18. Historical Background of EU Vertical Enforcement
19. Current Legal Structure of EU Vertical Enforcement
1. Block Exemptions and their role in vertical restraint enforcement
2. Article 101(3): a closer examination of the individual assessment and
its role in vertical restraint enforcement
20. Chapter Conclusion: EU Historical Origins and Legal Structure
Chapter 6 The Legal Concepts of By-Object, By-Effect and Appreciability
Abstract
21. Introduction to the Distinction between By-Object and By-Effect
22. A Background on By-Object Restrictions: The Finer Details
23. Categorisation and Analysis of By-Object Restrictions: A Deeper Dive
1. By-Object Categorisation: Overview of Differences between the EC and
Case Law Approaches
2. By-Object Categorisation: Approaches to Appreciability
24. By-Effect Comparison: A Concise Overview of the Main Differences
25. Return to the RPM Legal Structure in light of the By-Object/By-Effect
Dichotomy: Overview of the Current Approach to RPM Enforcement
1. Article 101(3): a closer examination of the individual assessment and
its role in RPM enforcement
26. Chapter Conclusion
PART III - PROPOSALS, IMPLICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS
Chapter 7 Proposals and Solutions
Abstract
27. Chapter Introduction
28. Time for a Change? Transatlantic Synchrony towards Revealing a
Malfunctioning Regime
1. RPM Legal Regime: Current Challenges undermining its Efficacy
29. Horizontal Non-consensus: Should NCAs have their own agenda?
30. A New Way Forward: Developing a More Viable Approach to RPM Enforcement
31. Proposed RPM Solutions
1. Solution 1: Escaping automatic Article 101(3) TFEU applicability:
developing a mechanism where RPM can be found inappreciable, and
therefore, not in violation of Article 101(1) TFEU
2. Solution 2: Eliminate RPM's hardcore designation by shifting its
inclusion in the VBER from Article 4 to Article 5
3. Solution 3: Elimination of RPM's hardcore designation through its
application to Article 2 of the VBER (original and modified case
scenarios)
4. Solution 4: Application of the De Minimus Doctrine to RPM
5. Solution 5: Recommendations for Improvement of Status Quo
32. Chapter Conclusion
Chapter 8 Conclusion
Abstract
33. Conclusion: Most Serious Considerations to Enhance the Efficacy of the
Current RPM Regime
1. Overview of Solutions: The Best Way Forward
34. Final Remarks
Annex 1 RPM US Origins
Annex 2. RPM Economic Models
Annex 3. RPM Model Timeline
Index
Contents
Preface
List of Abbreviations
List of Annexes and Tables
Chapter 1 Introduction
Abstract
1. Topic Introduction
1. Background on Assessment and Application: Legal Issues and
Development
2. Background on Enforcement Best Practices: Investigative Techniques
and Enforcement Protocol
2. Research Objectives and Main Research Questions
3. Structure and Scope of Book
4. Conclusory Remarks
PART I - US HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS
Chapter 2 The Legal and Political Origins of RPM - United States
Abstract
5. United States: Historical Origins & Legal Structure of RPM
1. The Introduction of the Sherman Act and its Common Law Roots:
1889-1910
2. Dr. Miles Era- the Right of Alienation and its Per Se Impact:
1911-1930
3. Fair Trade Era- Carving out Exceptions to the Sherman Act: 1930-1975
4. Post Fair Trade Era- Non-Price vs. Price Transition Towards Rule of
Reason: 1975 - 2007
5. Leegin Era- Maximum vs. Minimum RPM Transition Towards Rule of
Reason: 2007 - Present
6. Chapter Conclusion: US Historical Origins and Legal Structure
Chapter 3 The Economics of Vertical Agreements - Background
Abstract
7. Chapter Introduction
1. General Economic Background of Vertical Restraints
2. General Economic Background of RPM
8. Background on Economic Theories of RPM
9. Link Between Schools of Thought and Economic Models
10. General Structure of Models: Vertical and Horizontal Elements of RPM
11. Digital Single Market, the E-Commerce Sector Inquiry and the Internet
1. Goals of the EC: Digital Single Market and E-Commerce Sector Inquiry
2. Models of Change: How the Internet Changed Market Dynamics
12. Conclusion: RPM Economic Background and E- Commerce
Chapter 4 The Economics of Vertical Agreements - Models
Abstract
13. Anti-Competitive vs. Pro-competitive Economic Models of RPM
14. Anti-Competitive RPM Theories
1. Facilitating Collusion Upstream or Downstream
2. Increase in Prices, Lifecycles and Product Favouritism
3. Foreclosure and Restriction of Entry Both Upstream and Downstream
4. Foreclosure as a Commitment Device in Protection of Monopoly Rents
5. Dampen or Soften Competition Both Upstream and Downstream
15. Pro-Competitive RPM Theories
1. Special Services and Free-riding
2. Quality Certification and Signalling
3. Image Theory: The Allure of Paying More
4. Demand Uncertainty and Inventories
5. Outlets and Distribution Density
6. Moral Hazard and Double Moral Hazard
7. Production of a Good when Manufacturers' Risks are Low
8. Contract Enforcement Mechanism and Quality Control
9. Loss Leader Selling
10. Less Efficient Dealer and/or Distributional Efficiency
11. Price Discrimination
12. Spatial Price Discrimination
13. Where imposing an RPM floor leads to a decrease in collusive
behaviour
14. RPM with Optimal Delegation
15. New Market Entry or Product Launch
16. Pro-competitive models which rely on the purely vertical aspect of
RPM
16. Conclusion: No Consensus among Economists on Impact of RPM
PART II - EU HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND LEGAL STRUCTURE
Chapter 5 The Legal and Political Origins of RPM - European Union
Abstract
17. European Union: Historical Origins & Legal Structure of RPM
18. Historical Background of EU Vertical Enforcement
19. Current Legal Structure of EU Vertical Enforcement
1. Block Exemptions and their role in vertical restraint enforcement
2. Article 101(3): a closer examination of the individual assessment and
its role in vertical restraint enforcement
20. Chapter Conclusion: EU Historical Origins and Legal Structure
Chapter 6 The Legal Concepts of By-Object, By-Effect and Appreciability
Abstract
21. Introduction to the Distinction between By-Object and By-Effect
22. A Background on By-Object Restrictions: The Finer Details
23. Categorisation and Analysis of By-Object Restrictions: A Deeper Dive
1. By-Object Categorisation: Overview of Differences between the EC and
Case Law Approaches
2. By-Object Categorisation: Approaches to Appreciability
24. By-Effect Comparison: A Concise Overview of the Main Differences
25. Return to the RPM Legal Structure in light of the By-Object/By-Effect
Dichotomy: Overview of the Current Approach to RPM Enforcement
1. Article 101(3): a closer examination of the individual assessment and
its role in RPM enforcement
26. Chapter Conclusion
PART III - PROPOSALS, IMPLICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS
Chapter 7 Proposals and Solutions
Abstract
27. Chapter Introduction
28. Time for a Change? Transatlantic Synchrony towards Revealing a
Malfunctioning Regime
1. RPM Legal Regime: Current Challenges undermining its Efficacy
29. Horizontal Non-consensus: Should NCAs have their own agenda?
30. A New Way Forward: Developing a More Viable Approach to RPM Enforcement
31. Proposed RPM Solutions
1. Solution 1: Escaping automatic Article 101(3) TFEU applicability:
developing a mechanism where RPM can be found inappreciable, and
therefore, not in violation of Article 101(1) TFEU
2. Solution 2: Eliminate RPM's hardcore designation by shifting its
inclusion in the VBER from Article 4 to Article 5
3. Solution 3: Elimination of RPM's hardcore designation through its
application to Article 2 of the VBER (original and modified case
scenarios)
4. Solution 4: Application of the De Minimus Doctrine to RPM
5. Solution 5: Recommendations for Improvement of Status Quo
32. Chapter Conclusion
Chapter 8 Conclusion
Abstract
33. Conclusion: Most Serious Considerations to Enhance the Efficacy of the
Current RPM Regime
1. Overview of Solutions: The Best Way Forward
34. Final Remarks
Annex 1 RPM US Origins
Annex 2. RPM Economic Models
Annex 3. RPM Model Timeline
Index
Preface
List of Abbreviations
List of Annexes and Tables
Chapter 1 Introduction
Abstract
1. Topic Introduction
1. Background on Assessment and Application: Legal Issues and
Development
2. Background on Enforcement Best Practices: Investigative Techniques
and Enforcement Protocol
2. Research Objectives and Main Research Questions
3. Structure and Scope of Book
4. Conclusory Remarks
PART I - US HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS
Chapter 2 The Legal and Political Origins of RPM - United States
Abstract
5. United States: Historical Origins & Legal Structure of RPM
1. The Introduction of the Sherman Act and its Common Law Roots:
1889-1910
2. Dr. Miles Era- the Right of Alienation and its Per Se Impact:
1911-1930
3. Fair Trade Era- Carving out Exceptions to the Sherman Act: 1930-1975
4. Post Fair Trade Era- Non-Price vs. Price Transition Towards Rule of
Reason: 1975 - 2007
5. Leegin Era- Maximum vs. Minimum RPM Transition Towards Rule of
Reason: 2007 - Present
6. Chapter Conclusion: US Historical Origins and Legal Structure
Chapter 3 The Economics of Vertical Agreements - Background
Abstract
7. Chapter Introduction
1. General Economic Background of Vertical Restraints
2. General Economic Background of RPM
8. Background on Economic Theories of RPM
9. Link Between Schools of Thought and Economic Models
10. General Structure of Models: Vertical and Horizontal Elements of RPM
11. Digital Single Market, the E-Commerce Sector Inquiry and the Internet
1. Goals of the EC: Digital Single Market and E-Commerce Sector Inquiry
2. Models of Change: How the Internet Changed Market Dynamics
12. Conclusion: RPM Economic Background and E- Commerce
Chapter 4 The Economics of Vertical Agreements - Models
Abstract
13. Anti-Competitive vs. Pro-competitive Economic Models of RPM
14. Anti-Competitive RPM Theories
1. Facilitating Collusion Upstream or Downstream
2. Increase in Prices, Lifecycles and Product Favouritism
3. Foreclosure and Restriction of Entry Both Upstream and Downstream
4. Foreclosure as a Commitment Device in Protection of Monopoly Rents
5. Dampen or Soften Competition Both Upstream and Downstream
15. Pro-Competitive RPM Theories
1. Special Services and Free-riding
2. Quality Certification and Signalling
3. Image Theory: The Allure of Paying More
4. Demand Uncertainty and Inventories
5. Outlets and Distribution Density
6. Moral Hazard and Double Moral Hazard
7. Production of a Good when Manufacturers' Risks are Low
8. Contract Enforcement Mechanism and Quality Control
9. Loss Leader Selling
10. Less Efficient Dealer and/or Distributional Efficiency
11. Price Discrimination
12. Spatial Price Discrimination
13. Where imposing an RPM floor leads to a decrease in collusive
behaviour
14. RPM with Optimal Delegation
15. New Market Entry or Product Launch
16. Pro-competitive models which rely on the purely vertical aspect of
RPM
16. Conclusion: No Consensus among Economists on Impact of RPM
PART II - EU HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND LEGAL STRUCTURE
Chapter 5 The Legal and Political Origins of RPM - European Union
Abstract
17. European Union: Historical Origins & Legal Structure of RPM
18. Historical Background of EU Vertical Enforcement
19. Current Legal Structure of EU Vertical Enforcement
1. Block Exemptions and their role in vertical restraint enforcement
2. Article 101(3): a closer examination of the individual assessment and
its role in vertical restraint enforcement
20. Chapter Conclusion: EU Historical Origins and Legal Structure
Chapter 6 The Legal Concepts of By-Object, By-Effect and Appreciability
Abstract
21. Introduction to the Distinction between By-Object and By-Effect
22. A Background on By-Object Restrictions: The Finer Details
23. Categorisation and Analysis of By-Object Restrictions: A Deeper Dive
1. By-Object Categorisation: Overview of Differences between the EC and
Case Law Approaches
2. By-Object Categorisation: Approaches to Appreciability
24. By-Effect Comparison: A Concise Overview of the Main Differences
25. Return to the RPM Legal Structure in light of the By-Object/By-Effect
Dichotomy: Overview of the Current Approach to RPM Enforcement
1. Article 101(3): a closer examination of the individual assessment and
its role in RPM enforcement
26. Chapter Conclusion
PART III - PROPOSALS, IMPLICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS
Chapter 7 Proposals and Solutions
Abstract
27. Chapter Introduction
28. Time for a Change? Transatlantic Synchrony towards Revealing a
Malfunctioning Regime
1. RPM Legal Regime: Current Challenges undermining its Efficacy
29. Horizontal Non-consensus: Should NCAs have their own agenda?
30. A New Way Forward: Developing a More Viable Approach to RPM Enforcement
31. Proposed RPM Solutions
1. Solution 1: Escaping automatic Article 101(3) TFEU applicability:
developing a mechanism where RPM can be found inappreciable, and
therefore, not in violation of Article 101(1) TFEU
2. Solution 2: Eliminate RPM's hardcore designation by shifting its
inclusion in the VBER from Article 4 to Article 5
3. Solution 3: Elimination of RPM's hardcore designation through its
application to Article 2 of the VBER (original and modified case
scenarios)
4. Solution 4: Application of the De Minimus Doctrine to RPM
5. Solution 5: Recommendations for Improvement of Status Quo
32. Chapter Conclusion
Chapter 8 Conclusion
Abstract
33. Conclusion: Most Serious Considerations to Enhance the Efficacy of the
Current RPM Regime
1. Overview of Solutions: The Best Way Forward
34. Final Remarks
Annex 1 RPM US Origins
Annex 2. RPM Economic Models
Annex 3. RPM Model Timeline
Index