James H. Cox

Reviewing Delegation (eBook, PDF)

An Analysis of the Congressional Reauthorization Process

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

Members of Congress often delegate power to bureaucratic experts, but they fear losing permanent control of the policy. One way Congress has dealt with this problem is to require reauthorization of the program or policy. Cox argues that Congress uses this power selectively, and is more likely to require reauthorization when policy is complex or they do not trust the executive branch. By contrast, reauthorization is less likely to be required when there are large disagreements about policy within Congress. In the process, Cox shows that committees are important independent actors in the legislative process, and that committees with homogenous policy preferences may have an advantage in getting their bills through Congress.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Bloomsbury Publishing Inc
• Seitenzahl: 176
• Altersempfehlung: ab 7 Jahre
• Erscheinungstermin: 30. April 2004
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9780313057342
• Artikelnr.: 37834712

Autorenporträt

JAMES H. COX is Assistant Professor, Department of Government, California State University, Sacramento.

Inhaltsangabe

Preface List of Abbreviations List of Figures List of Tables Understanding
Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy Four Models of Agenda Control
Toward a Tradeoff Explanation of Control The Authorization Process Case
Studies of the Choice to Use Temporary Authorization Comparing the Success
of Passing Reauthorization Legislation across Agencies A Quantitative
Assessment of Transaction Cost Theory Conclusion Appendix