Brian Skyrms

Social Dynamics (eBook, ePUB)

• Format: ePub

Produktbeschreibung

Brian Skyrms presents eighteen essays which apply adaptive dynamics (of cultural evolution and individual learning) to social theory. Altruism, spite, fairness, trust, division of labor, and signaling are treated from this perspective. Correlation is seen to be of fundamental importance. Interactions with neighbors in space, on static networks, and on co-evolving dynamics networks are investigated. Spontaneous emergence of social structure and of signaling systems are examined in the context of learning dynamics.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Oxford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 368
• Erscheinungstermin: 22. Mai 2014
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9780191017964
• Artikelnr.: 40879500

Autorenporträt

Brian Skyrms is Distinguished Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science and Economics at the University of California, Irvine. His interests cover a range of topics, including the evolution of conventions, the social contract, inductive logic, decision theory, rational deliberation, the metaphysics of logical atomism, causality, and truth. He is the author of Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information (OUP, 2010) and From Zeno to Arbitrage: Essays on Quantity. Coherence, and Induction (OUP, 2012).

Inhaltsangabe

* Introduction
* Part I: Correlation and the Social Contract
* Introduction to part I
* 1: Evolution and the Social Contract
* Part II: Importance of Dynamics
* Introduction to part II
* 2: Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract
* 3: with Jason Alexander: Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice
Contagious?
* 4: Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary
Models
* 5: Dynamics of Conformist Bias
* 6: Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange
Attractors in Evolutionary Game Dynamics
* 7: with Jorge Pacheco, Francisco Santos and Max Souza: Evolutionary
Dynamics of Collective Action in N-person Stag Hunt Dilemmas
* 8: with Peter Vanderschraaf: Learning to Take Turns
* 9: with Kevin Zollman: Evolutionary Considerations in the Framing of
Social Norms
* Part III: Dynamic Networks
* Introduction to part III
* 10: with Robin Pemantle: Learning to Network
* 11: with Robin Pemantle: A Dynamic Model of Social Network Formation
* 12: with Robin Pemantle: Network Formation by Reinforcement Learning:
The Long and the Medium Run
* 13: with Robin Pemantle: Time to Absorption in Discounted
Reinforcement Models
* Part IV: Dynamics of Signals
* Introduction to part IV
* 14: with Raffaele Argiento, Robin Pemantle and Stanislav Volkov:
Learning to Signal: Analysis of a Micro-Level Reinforcement Model
* 15: with Jason McKenzie Alexander and Sandy L. Zabell: Inventing New
Signals
* 16: Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient
Information
* 17: with Francesco Santos and Jorge Pacheco: Co-Evolution of Pre-Play
Signaling and Cooperation
* 18: Evolution of Signaling Systems with Multiple Senders and
Receivers
* Index