Ellen Lust-Okar

eBook, PDF

Structuring Conflict in the Arab World (eBook, PDF)

Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions

Beschreibung

This book examines how ruling elites manage and manipulate their political opposition in the Middle East. In contrast to discussions of government-opposition relations that focus on how rulers either punish or co-opt opponents, this book focuses on the effect of institutional rules governing the opposition. It argues rules determining who is and is not allowed to participate in the formal political arena affect not only the relationships between opponents and the state, but also between various opposition groups. This affects the dynamics of opposition during prolonged economic crises. It also shapes the informal strategies that ruling elites use toward opponents. The argument is presented using a formal model of government-opposition relations. It is demonstrated in the cases of Egypt under Presidents Nasir, Sadat and Mubarek; Jordan under King Husayn; and Morocco under King Hasan II.

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Autor

Ellen Lust-Okar is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Yale University. She received her M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies and her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Michigan. She has studied and conducted research in Jordan, Morocco, Israel, Palestine and Syria, and her work examining the relationships between states and oppositions has appeared in Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Middle Eastern Studies and other volumes. She is currently working on a second manuscript, Linking Domestic and International Conflict: The Case of Middle East Rivalries, with Paul Huth at the University of Michigan.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Erscheinungstermin: 10. Januar 2005
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9780511081354
• Artikelnr.: 38201898

Rezensionen

'For more than a decade, observers have been puzzled by the failure of the opposition in the Arab world to take advantage of timid regime liberalizations to push harder for genuine democratic reform. Now we have the answer. In this remarkable - indeed, almost unique - marriage of thorough field research in the Arab world and rigorous formal modelling, Lust-Okar explains how regimes write rules that discourage opposition groups from mobilization, even when they have the resources to do so. This book is an all too-rare treat, a work that deploys real science to illuminate real politics.' Lisa Anderson, Columbia University