The prevalence of imperfect structures, externalities, and imperfect information in existing market systems prevents the market from serving as an efficient mechanism for resource allocation. In the presence of such failures, optimization of economic activities provides an effective remedial measure. Cooperative optimization suggests the possibility of socially optimal and individually rational solutions to decision problems involving strategic action over time; however, to guarantee that cooperation will last throughout the agreement period, the stringent condition of subgame consistency is required.
This textbook presents a treatise on subgame consistent economic optimization, developing game-theoretic optimization techniques to establish the foundation for an effective policy menu to tackle sub-optimal circumstances that the conventional market mechanism fails to resolve. Topics covered include:
* dynamic optimization;
* group optimality and individual rationality;
* time (optimal-trajectory-subgame) consistent economic optimization;
* dynamic economic optimization under uncertainty and subgame consistency;
* dynamically stable joint ventures;
* collaborative environmental management;
* discrete-time subgame consistent economic optimization.
This is the first book to thoroughly address the topic of subgame consistent economic optimization. It will be of particular interest as a research reference for game theorists, economists, mathematicians, policy makers, and corporate planners. With ample problems and exercises, it is also a useful text for graduate students in game theory.
This textbook presents a treatise on subgame consistent economic optimization, developing game-theoretic optimization techniques to establish the foundation for an effective policy menu to tackle sub-optimal circumstances that the conventional market mechanism fails to resolve. Topics covered include:
* dynamic optimization;
* group optimality and individual rationality;
* time (optimal-trajectory-subgame) consistent economic optimization;
* dynamic economic optimization under uncertainty and subgame consistency;
* dynamically stable joint ventures;
* collaborative environmental management;
* discrete-time subgame consistent economic optimization.
This is the first book to thoroughly address the topic of subgame consistent economic optimization. It will be of particular interest as a research reference for game theorists, economists, mathematicians, policy makers, and corporate planners. With ample problems and exercises, it is also a useful text for graduate students in game theory.
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Advance praise for Subgame Consistent Economic Optimization:
"The text is truly a world-leading treatise in the field of dynamically consistent economic optimization and a Russian classic in mathematics and economics. It is a timely publication to tackle the increasingly crucial issues of consistency and dynamic stability in collaborative activities in the economic arena. The elegant mathematics developed by the authors and their [useful] applications in economics are prevalent in the analysis. The text expanded L. V. Kantorovich's award-winning work in economic optimization significantly in the new directions of game-theoretic interaction, dynamic evolution, stochasticity, and subgame consistency." -- Vladimir Mazalov, Director of Karelian Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Russian Academy of Sciences
"The text is truly a world-leading treatise in the field of dynamically consistent economic optimization and a Russian classic in mathematics and economics. It is a timely publication to tackle the increasingly crucial issues of consistency and dynamic stability in collaborative activities in the economic arena. The elegant mathematics developed by the authors and their [useful] applications in economics are prevalent in the analysis. The text expanded L. V. Kantorovich's award-winning work in economic optimization significantly in the new directions of game-theoretic interaction, dynamic evolution, stochasticity, and subgame consistency." -- Vladimir Mazalov, Director of Karelian Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Russian Academy of Sciences
"The book is a comprehensive treatise on subgame consistent economic optimization. It is an important methodological contribution to the research on consistency and dynamic stability of cooperative strategies, developed originally by the authors. ... The book is well organized and clear; moreover, it provides an extensive reference list to the relevant economic differential game literature." (Bruno Viscolani, Mathematical Reviews, January, 2013)
From the reviews: Advance praise for Subgame Consistent Economic Optimization: The text is truly a world-leading treatise in the field of dynamically consistent economic optimization and a Russian classic in mathematics and economics. It is a timely publication to tackle the increasingly crucial issues of consistency and dynamic stability in collaborative activities in the economic arena. The elegant mathematics developed by the authors and their [useful] applications in economics are prevalent in the analysis. The text expanded L. V. Kantorovich's award-winning work in economic optimization significantly in the new directions of game-theoretic interaction, dynamic evolution, stochasticity, and subgame consistency. Vladimir Mazalov, Director of Karelian Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Russian Academy of Sciences "The book is a comprehensive treatise on subgame consistent economic optimization. It is an important methodological contribution to the research on consistency and dynamic stability of cooperative strategies, developed originally by the authors. ... The book is well organized and clear; moreover, it provides an extensive reference list to the relevant economic differential game literature." (Bruno Viscolani, Mathematical Reviews, January, 2013)