40,95 €
40,95 €
inkl. MwSt.
Sofort per Download lieferbar
payback
20 °P sammeln
40,95 €
40,95 €
inkl. MwSt.
Sofort per Download lieferbar

Alle Infos zum eBook verschenken
payback
20 °P sammeln
Als Download kaufen
40,95 €
inkl. MwSt.
Sofort per Download lieferbar
payback
20 °P sammeln
Jetzt verschenken
40,95 €
inkl. MwSt.
Sofort per Download lieferbar

Alle Infos zum eBook verschenken
payback
20 °P sammeln
  • Format: PDF

I. The concept of competition played a central role in the very first attempts to apply the tools of economics to the analysis of politics. Adopting Hotelling's (1929) industrial organization model of imperfect competition in markets in which space has a predominant role, Downs (1957), following on some perceptive insights of Schumpeter (1942), was able to formulate a model of electoral competition in which political parties, seeking the support of citizens, compete against each other in offering policies designed to elicit their vote. Downs' model and the numerous variants to which it gave…mehr

  • Geräte: PC
  • ohne Kopierschutz
  • eBook Hilfe
  • Größe: 31.01MB
Produktbeschreibung
I. The concept of competition played a central role in the very first attempts to apply the tools of economics to the analysis of politics. Adopting Hotelling's (1929) industrial organization model of imperfect competition in markets in which space has a predominant role, Downs (1957), following on some perceptive insights of Schumpeter (1942), was able to formulate a model of electoral competition in which political parties, seeking the support of citizens, compete against each other in offering policies designed to elicit their vote. Downs' model and the numerous variants to which it gave birth soon became the major component of what was to become Public Choice Theory. The enormous efforts of the last 30 years devoted to modelling electoral competition have helped improve our understanding of politics and have contributed a basic element that undoubtedly will remain essential to any reasonably complete theory of politics. But whatever may have been early expectations, it is now clear that electoral competition will only be one such element. More recently, the idea of competition has been used to model interest-group behavior. Becker (1983), building on earlier work by Bentley (1908), Truman (1958), Olson (1965), Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), applied the Public Finance analysis of the excess-burden of taxes and subsidies - to which, incidentally, Hotelling (1938) had made pioneering contribution- to produce a model in which competition between interest groups determines an equilibrium distribution of income.

Dieser Download kann aus rechtlichen Gründen nur mit Rechnungsadresse in A, B, BG, CY, CZ, D, DK, EW, E, FIN, F, GR, HR, H, IRL, I, LT, L, LR, M, NL, PL, P, R, S, SLO, SK ausgeliefert werden.

Rezensionen
All in all, the contributions are very interesting, stimulating, and well written. The book is a valuable supplement to the academic literature, and it should attract the attention of every scholar being interested in the field.
Journal of Economics/ Vol.54 Nr. 3
All in all, the contributions are very interesting, stimulating, and well written. The book is a valuable supplement to the academic literature, and it should attract the attention of every scholar being interested in the field.
Journal of Economics/ Vol.54 Nr. 3