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This book provides the first detailed history of the Constitution's treaty supremacy rule. It describes a process of invisible constitutional change. The traditional supremacy rule provided that all treaties supersede conflicting state laws; it precluded state governments from violating U.S. treaty obligations. Before 1945, treaty supremacy and self-execution were independent doctrines. Supremacy governed the relationship between treaties and state law. Self-execution governed the division of power over treaty implementation between Congress and the President. In 1945, the U.S. ratified the UN…mehr

Produktbeschreibung
This book provides the first detailed history of the Constitution's treaty supremacy rule. It describes a process of invisible constitutional change. The traditional supremacy rule provided that all treaties supersede conflicting state laws; it precluded state governments from violating U.S. treaty obligations. Before 1945, treaty supremacy and self-execution were independent doctrines. Supremacy governed the relationship between treaties and state law. Self-execution governed the division of power over treaty implementation between Congress and the President. In 1945, the U.S. ratified the UN Charter, which obligates nations to promote human rights "for all without distinction as to race." In 1950, a California court applied the Charter's human rights provisions and the traditional treaty supremacy rule to invalidate a state law that discriminated against Japanese nationals. The implications were shocking: the decision implied that the United States had effectively abrogated Jim Crow laws throughout the South by ratifying the UN Charter. In response, conservatives mobilized support for a constitutional amendment, known as the Bricker Amendment, to abolish the treaty supremacy rule. The amendment never passed, but Bricker's supporters achieved their goals through de facto constitutional change. The de facto Bricker Amendment created a novel exception to the treaty supremacy rule for non-self-executing (NSE) treaties. The exception permits state governments to violate NSE treaties without authorization from the federal political branches. The death of treaty supremacy has significant implications for U.S. foreign policy and for U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations.

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Autorenporträt
David L. Sloss is Professor of Law at Santa Clara University School of Law. His scholarship focuses on the application of international law in domestic courts, with specializations in international human rights, treaties, U.S. foreign relations law, and constitutional law. He is the editor of The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement: A Comparative Study (2009), and co-editor of International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court: Continuity and Change (2011). He has published numerous articles on the history of U.S. foreign affairs law and the judicial enforcement of treaties in domestic courts. Professor Sloss received his B.A. from Hampshire College, his M.P.P. from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, and his J.D. from Stanford Law School. He taught for nine years at Saint Louis University School of Law. Before he was a law professor, he worked for the U.S. government on arms control and nuclear proliferation issues.