The Nature of Moral Responsibility (eBook, PDF)

New Essays
Redaktion: Clarke, Randolph; Smith, Angela M.; McKenna, Michael

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

What is it to be morally responsible for something? Recent philosophical work reveals considerable disagreement on the question. Indeed, some theorists claim to distinguish several varieties of moral responsibility, with different conditions that must be satisfied if one is to bear responsibility of one or another of these kinds. Debate on this point turns partly on disagreement about the kinds of responses made appropriate when one is blameworthy or praiseworthy. It is generally agreed that these include "reactive attitudes" such as resentment and gratitude, but theorists disagree about the nature of these attitudes. They dispute the connections between moral responsibility, desert, and the justification of punishment as well. Many theorists take it that, whatever the appropriate responses are, they are responses to an agent's "quality of will," but there is no consensus on what this comes to. Are the agent's beliefs about the moral status of her behavior what matter, or is it what she cares about, or what she judges important? This volume presents twelve original essays from participants in these debates. The contributors include prominent established figures as well as influential younger philosophers. A substantive introduction by the editors surveys recent debates and situates the contributions within it.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Oxford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 448
• Erscheinungstermin: 1. April 2015
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9780199998081
• Artikelnr.: 42511480

Autorenporträt

Randolph Clarke is Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University. He is the author of Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (Oxford University Press, 2003), Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2014) and numerous articles on agency, free will, and moral responsibility. Michael McKenna is Professor and Keith Lehrer Chair in the Department of Philosophy and Center for the Philosophy of Freedom at the University of Arizona. He is the author of Conversation and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2012) and numerous articles on free will and moral responsibility. Angela Smith is Roger Mudd Professor of Ethics and Director of the Roger Mudd Center for Ethics at Washington and Lee University. She is the author of numerous articles on moral responsibility, moral agency, and moral psychology.

Inhaltsangabe

* Acknowledgments
* Notes on Contributors
* Introduction
* Part I. The Nature of Moral Responsibility: Some Frameworks
* Chapter 1. Neal A. Tognazzini, The Strains of Involvement
* Chapter 2. Michael J. Zimmerman, Varieties of Moral Responsibility
* Chapter 3. Gideon Rosen, The Alethic Conception of Moral
Responsibility
* Chapter 4. T. M. Scanlon, Forms and Conditions of Responsibility
* Part II. Quality of Will and the Deep Self
* Chapter 5. David Shoemaker, Ecumenical Attributability
* Chapter 6. Nomy Arpaly, Huckleberry Finn Revisited: Inverse Akrasia
and Moral Ignorance
* Chapter 7. Julia Driver, Appraisability, Attributability, and Moral
Agency
* Chapter 8. Holly M. Smith, Dual-Process Theory and Moral
Responsibility
* Part III. Responsibility in Practice: Communication, Substantive
Responsibility, and Moral
* Desert
* Chapter 9. Coleen Macnamara, Blame, Communication, and Morally
Responsible Agency
* Chapter 10. George Sher, Responsibility, Conversation, and
Communication
* Chapter 11. Rahul Kumar, Contractualism and the Roots of
Responsibility
* Chapter 12. Derk Pereboom, A Notion of Moral Responsibility Immune to
the Threat from
* Causal Determination
* Suggested Further Readings
* Index