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The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility is a collection of 33 articles by leading international scholars on the topic of moral responsibility and its main forms, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. The articles in the volume provide a comprehensive survey on scholarship on this topic since 1960, with a focus on the past three decades. Articles address the nature of moral responsibility - whether it is fundamentally a matter of deserved blame and praise, or whether it is grounded anticipated good consequences, such as moral education and formation, or whether there are different kinds of…mehr
The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility is a collection of 33 articles by leading international scholars on the topic of moral responsibility and its main forms, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. The articles in the volume provide a comprehensive survey on scholarship on this topic since 1960, with a focus on the past three decades. Articles address the nature of moral responsibility - whether it is fundamentally a matter of deserved blame and praise, or whether it is grounded anticipated good consequences, such as moral education and formation, or whether there are different kinds of moral responsibility. They examine responsibility for both actions and omissions, whether responsibility comes in degrees, and whether groups such as corporations can be responsible. The traditional debates about moral responsibility focus on the threats posed from causal determinism, and from the absence of the ability to do otherwise that may result. The articles in this volume build on these arguments and appraise the most recent developments in these debates. Philosophical reflection on the personal relationships and moral responsibility has been especially intense over the past two decades, and several articles reflect this development. Other chapters take up the link between blameworthiness and attitudes such as moral resentment and indignation, while others explore the role that forgiveness and reconciliation play in personal relationships and responsibility. The range of articles in this volume look at moral responsibility from a range of perspectives and disciplines, explaining how physics, neuroscience, and psychological research on topics such as addiction and implicit bias illuminate the ways and degrees to which we might be responsible.
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Dana Kay Nelkin (Ph.D. UCLA) is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego, and Affiliate Professor at the University of San Diego School of Law. Her areas of research include moral psychology, ethics, bioethics, and philosophy of law. She is the author of Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility, and co-editor of the The Ethics and Law of Omissions. Her work in moral psychology includes participation in an interdisciplinary research collaboration of philosophers and psychologists, The Moral Judgements Project. Derk Pereboom (Ph.D. UCLA) is the Susan Linn Sage Professor in the Philosophy Department at Cornell University and Senior Associate Dean for Arts and Humanities in Cornell's College of Arts and Sciences. His areas of research include free will and moral responsibility, philosophy of mind, early modern philosophy, especially Kant, and philosophy of religion. He is the author of Living without Free Will, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, and he is co-author with Michael McKenna of Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction. He has published articles on free will and moral responsibility, consciousness and physicalism, nonreductive materialism, divine providence, the problem of evil, and on Kant's metaphysics and epistemology.
Inhaltsangabe
* Introduction * I. Theories of Responsibility * 1: Manuel Vargas: Instrumentalist Theories of Responsibility * 2: Michael McKenna: Reasons-Responsiveness, Frankfurt Examples, and the Free Will Ability * 3: Matthew Talbert : Attributionist Theories of Responsibility * II. Kinds of Responsibility * 4: Sofia Jeppsson : Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: On Different Kinds of Moral Responsibility * III. Dimensions of Responsibility * 5: Randolph Clarke: Responsibility for Acts and Omissions * 6: Justin Coates: Degrees of Responsibility * 7: Christian List : Group Responsibility * IV. Determinism and the Ability to Do Otherwise * 8: Derk Pereboom: Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt Examples * 9: Derk Pereboom and Michael McKenna : Manipulation Arguments against Compatibilism * V. Skepticism * 10: Saul Smilansky: Illusionism * 11: Gregg D. Caruso: Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Justice: The Public Health-Quarantine Model * 12: Tamler Sommers : Metaskepticism * VI. Blame * 13: Angela Smith: Blame and Holding Responsible * 14: R. Jay Wallace: Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes * 15: David Shoemaker : Response-Dependence Accounts of Blameworthiness * VII. Responsibility, Knowledge, and Causation * 16: Elizabeth Harman: Ethics is Hard! What Follows? On Moral Ignorance and Blame * 17: Carolina Sartorio : Responsibility and Causation * VIII. Responsibility, Law, and Justice * 18: David Brink: Responsibility, Punishment, and Predominant Retributivism * 19: Elizabeth Shaw: Legal Responsibility: Psychopathy, a Case Study * 20: Richard Arneson : Responsibility and Distributive Justice * IX. Responsibility, Neuroscience, and Psychology * 21: Alfred R. Mele: Responsibility and Neuroscience * 22: Peter Carruthers and Matt King: Responsibility and Consciousness * 23: Brandon Warmke: Responsibility and Situationism * 24: Gunnar Björnsson : Experimental Philosophy and Moral Responsibility * X. Responsibility, Relationships, and Meaning in Life * 25: Paul Russell: Moral Responsibility and Existential Attitudes * 26: Dana Kay Nelkin: Relationships and Responsibility * 27: Seth Shabo: Responsibility, Personal Relationships, and the Significance of the Reactive Attitudes * 28: Per-Erik Milam: Forgiveness * 29: Linda Radzik: Reconciliation and he End of Responsibility * 30: Dan Speak : Responsibility and Religion * XI. Case Studies * 31: Doug McConnell: Moral Responsibility in the Context of Addiction * 32: Maureen Sie: Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias and the Impact of Social Categorization * 33: John Doris and Dominic Murphy: Atrocity, Evil, and Responsibility
* Introduction * I. Theories of Responsibility * 1: Manuel Vargas: Instrumentalist Theories of Responsibility * 2: Michael McKenna: Reasons-Responsiveness, Frankfurt Examples, and the Free Will Ability * 3: Matthew Talbert : Attributionist Theories of Responsibility * II. Kinds of Responsibility * 4: Sofia Jeppsson : Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: On Different Kinds of Moral Responsibility * III. Dimensions of Responsibility * 5: Randolph Clarke: Responsibility for Acts and Omissions * 6: Justin Coates: Degrees of Responsibility * 7: Christian List : Group Responsibility * IV. Determinism and the Ability to Do Otherwise * 8: Derk Pereboom: Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt Examples * 9: Derk Pereboom and Michael McKenna : Manipulation Arguments against Compatibilism * V. Skepticism * 10: Saul Smilansky: Illusionism * 11: Gregg D. Caruso: Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Justice: The Public Health-Quarantine Model * 12: Tamler Sommers : Metaskepticism * VI. Blame * 13: Angela Smith: Blame and Holding Responsible * 14: R. Jay Wallace: Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes * 15: David Shoemaker : Response-Dependence Accounts of Blameworthiness * VII. Responsibility, Knowledge, and Causation * 16: Elizabeth Harman: Ethics is Hard! What Follows? On Moral Ignorance and Blame * 17: Carolina Sartorio : Responsibility and Causation * VIII. Responsibility, Law, and Justice * 18: David Brink: Responsibility, Punishment, and Predominant Retributivism * 19: Elizabeth Shaw: Legal Responsibility: Psychopathy, a Case Study * 20: Richard Arneson : Responsibility and Distributive Justice * IX. Responsibility, Neuroscience, and Psychology * 21: Alfred R. Mele: Responsibility and Neuroscience * 22: Peter Carruthers and Matt King: Responsibility and Consciousness * 23: Brandon Warmke: Responsibility and Situationism * 24: Gunnar Björnsson : Experimental Philosophy and Moral Responsibility * X. Responsibility, Relationships, and Meaning in Life * 25: Paul Russell: Moral Responsibility and Existential Attitudes * 26: Dana Kay Nelkin: Relationships and Responsibility * 27: Seth Shabo: Responsibility, Personal Relationships, and the Significance of the Reactive Attitudes * 28: Per-Erik Milam: Forgiveness * 29: Linda Radzik: Reconciliation and he End of Responsibility * 30: Dan Speak : Responsibility and Religion * XI. Case Studies * 31: Doug McConnell: Moral Responsibility in the Context of Addiction * 32: Maureen Sie: Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias and the Impact of Social Categorization * 33: John Doris and Dominic Murphy: Atrocity, Evil, and Responsibility
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