I. Speller

The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defense Policy (eBook, PDF)

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

This book breaks new ground as the first full account of the role of amphibious warfare in British strategy between VE Day and the Anglo-French assault on Suez in 1956. Ian Speller analyses the development of postwar strategic planning and the manner in which this influenced the nature of Britain's armed forces in the 1940s and 1950s. By detailing the development of equipment, doctrine and the role of the Royal Marines he sheds new light on the military response to a succession of overseas crises.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan UK
• Seitenzahl: 250
• Erscheinungstermin: 3. August 2001
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781403907608
• Artikelnr.: 38460178

Autorenporträt

IAN SPELLER is Lecturer in Defence Studies at the Joint Services Command and Staff College. His research interests are amphibious warfare, maritime strategy and British foreign and defence policy.

Inhaltsangabe

Acknowledgements Introduction Amphibious Renaissance The Torch of Combined Operations Cinderella of the Services Operational Capabilities and Lost Opportunities Amphibious Equipment Amphibious Ambassadors and Vertical Envelopment Operation Musketeer Epilogue Appendices Bibliography Index

Rezensionen

'In his meticulously researched book Ian Speller tells us why between 1945 and 1956, in a throw-back to pre-Second World War thinking, amphibious warfare was the orphan of British strategy, despite stunning successes such as the Allied landings in Normandy. This book is a must for anyone with a serious interest in British Defence Policy.' - Julian Thompson, Major General

'Ian Speller is the leading expert on Britain's amphibious capabilities in the post Second World War era and has produced an excellent and comprehensive survey of their evolution in the period 1945-1956. He explains in a critical but balanced manner why this key maritime warfare area suffered from the neglect that was reflect in the problems in forming an effective amphibious force for the Suez landings. The book, which contains much that is new and original, should be essential reading for students of British naval policy and British defence policy as a whole.' - Eric Grove, Centre for Security Studies, University of Hull