Stefano Bertea

Theory of Legal Obligation (eBook, ePUB)

• Format: ePub

Produktbeschreibung

The focus of this monograph lies in the construction of a theory of legal obligation, understanding it as a discrete notion with its own defining traits. In this work, Bertea specifically addresses the question: how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized? The conceptualization of legal obligation he defends in this work gradually emerges from a critical assessment of the theories of legal obligation that have been most influential in the contemporary legal-theoretical debate. Building on such critical analysis, Bertea's study purports to offer a novel and unconventional conceptualization of legal obligation, which is characterized as a law-engendered intersubjective reason for carrying out certain courses of conduct.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Erscheinungstermin: 3. Oktober 2019
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781108679541
• Artikelnr.: 62745458

Autorenporträt

Stefano Bertea is a Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft research fellow at the Goethe Universität and an Associate Professor at the University of Leicester. Previously, he was a Marie Sk¿odowska-Curie research fellow at the University of Edinburgh and at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, a visiting research fellow at the Am Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Germany, an Alexander von Humboldt research fellow at the Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, a senior research fellow at the Universiteit Antwerpen, a visiting professor at the Università degli Studi di Verona and at the Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia, and a visiting researcher at the Universiteit van Amsterdam.

Inhaltsangabe

Introduction
1. The concept of obligation
2. Contemporary approaches to legal obligations: a preliminary map
3. The social-practice account
4. The interpretivist account
5. The conventionalist reason account
6. The exclusionary reason account
7. A revisionary Kantian conception
8. Further dimensions of the revisionary Kantian conception
9. The robust reason account
10. The method of presuppositional interpretation
Conclusion.