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  • Format: ePub

The Volatility Curse examines the conditions under which economic voting can (and cannot) function as a mechanism of democratic accountability, challenging existing theories that are largely based on experiences in developed democracies. Drawing on cross-national data from around the world and micro-level evidence from Latin America, Daniela Campello and Cesar Zucco make two broad, related arguments. First, they show that economic voting is pervasive around the world, but in economically volatile developing democracies that are dependent on commodity exports and inflows of foreign capital,…mehr

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Produktbeschreibung
The Volatility Curse examines the conditions under which economic voting can (and cannot) function as a mechanism of democratic accountability, challenging existing theories that are largely based on experiences in developed democracies. Drawing on cross-national data from around the world and micro-level evidence from Latin America, Daniela Campello and Cesar Zucco make two broad, related arguments. First, they show that economic voting is pervasive around the world, but in economically volatile developing democracies that are dependent on commodity exports and inflows of foreign capital, economic outcomes are highly contingent on conditions beyond government control, which nonetheless determine relevant political outcomes like elections, popular support, and government transitions. Second, politicians are aware of these misattribution patterns and are often able to anticipate their electoral prospects well before elections. This reduces incumbents' incentives to maximize voter welfare, as anticipated by economic voting theories, and increases the likelihood of shirking, waste, and corruption.

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Autorenporträt
Daniela Campello is Associate Professor of Politics at the Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration, Fundação Getúlio Vargas. Her research lies on the frontier of comparative and international political economy, with a focus on the consequences of globalization to domestic politics in emerging economies. She is the author of The Politics of Market Discipline in Latin America (2015), and her work also appears in top political science journals. Daniela was an Oxford-CAF Visiting Fellow of International Economics at the University of Oxford and was previously an Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, New Jersey.