Gerhard Clemenz

Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktdetails

• Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 272
• Verlag: Springer / Springer Berlin Heidelberg / Springer, Berlin
• Artikelnr. des Verlages: 978-3-540-16778-5
• 1986.
• Seitenzahl: 228
• Erscheinungstermin: 1. August 1986
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 244mm x 170mm x 13mm
• Gewicht: 370g
• ISBN-13: 9783540167785
• ISBN-10: 3540167781
• Artikelnr.: 09200048

Autorenporträt

Gerhard Clemenz war nach einer Berufsausbildung als Bankkaufmann und dem Studium der Betriebswirtschaft und der Wirtschaftspädagogik im Finanzwesen zweier großer Industrieunternehmen tätig. Bis 2010 war er Leiter der Fachbereiche Bankkaufleute und Industriekaufleute an der Staatlichen Berufsschule Erlangen.

Inhaltsangabe

Ch. 0: Introduction and General Overview.- 0.1 Subject and Scope.- 0.2 Summary of Contents.- Ch. 1: Approaches to Equilibrium Credit Rationing.- 1.1 A General Description of a Credit Market.- 1.2 Definition of Credit Rationing.- 1.3 Borrowers With Different Wealth Endowments.- 1.4 The Role of the Horizontal Integration of the Banking Firm.- 1.5 Implicit Contracts and Credit Rationing.- 1.6 Concluding Remarks.- Ch. 2: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Credit Rationing.- 2.1 The Basic Model.- 2.2 Projects of Different Riskiness.- 2.3 Borrowers of Different Honesty.- 2.4 Borrowers With Different Abilities.- 2.5 Unobservable Effort of Borrowers.- 2.6 Concluding Remarks.- Ch. 3: Credit Rationing in Multi-Period Models.- 3.1 Overview.- 3.2 Rationing as an Incentive Device.- 3.3 Experience Rating of Borrowers.- 3.4 Rationing With Endogenous Costs of Default.- 3.5 Bankruptcy as a Joint Decision of Bank and Borrower.- 3.6 Concluding Remarks.- Ch. 4: Screening vs. Rationing. The Role of Collateral.- 4.1 Overview.- 4.2 Projects of Different Riskiness.- 4.3 The Jaffee and Russell Model.- 4.4 Borrowers With Different Abilities.- 4.5 Borrowers With Unobservable Effort.- 4.6 Concluding Remarks.- Ch. 5: Loan Markets With Perfectly Divisible Projects.- 5.1 Overview.- 5.2 A Loan Market With Certain Returns.- 5.3 A Loan Market With Uncertain Returns.- 5.4 The Nash-Equilibrium With Borrowers of Different Abilities.- Ch. 6: Variable Loan Size, Signalling and Endogenous Information.- 6.1 Overview.- 6.2 Success-Failure Projects and Different Abilities.- 6.3 Strategic Stability of Credit Market Equilibria.- 6.4 Projects of Different Riskiness.- 6.5 Borrowers With Different Default Costs.- 6.6 Exchange of Information Between Banks.- 6.7 Concluding Remarks 173 Appendix.- Ch. 7: Variable LoanSize and Type II Rationing.- 7.1 Overview.- 7.2 The Basic Model.- 7.3 Loan Applicants With Different Default Costs.- 7.4 Loan Applicants With Different Abilities.- 7.5 Projects of Different Riskiness.- 7.6 The Role of Effort.- 7.7 Concluding Remarks.- Ch. 8: Epilogue: Whither Now.