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Research Problem. The Army does not use leader initiative as a criteria to design units. Yet, Army doctrine requires that leaders display initiative on the decentralized battlefield. The Army may therefore not be able to fight on the decentralized battlefield. This monograph seeks the answer to the question: do the Army's current tactical spans of control facilitate the leader initiative required to fight on the empty, decentralized battlefield? Research Method. The monograph describes the nature of battle, establishes the need for leader initiative, and explains the basis for military span of…mehr

Produktbeschreibung
Research Problem. The Army does not use leader initiative as a criteria to design units. Yet, Army doctrine requires that leaders display initiative on the decentralized battlefield. The Army may therefore not be able to fight on the decentralized battlefield. This monograph seeks the answer to the question: do the Army's current tactical spans of control facilitate the leader initiative required to fight on the empty, decentralized battlefield? Research Method. The monograph describes the nature of battle, establishes the need for leader initiative, and explains the basis for military span of control. Theory provides a framework to understand decentralized battle and the impacts of varying spans of control. History and current trends then confirm or deny the theories. Analysis then compares and contrasts various spans of control in several military organizations relative to the established criteria: initiative, decentralization, and control. Conclusions. Modern weapons'; lethality makes battlefield control difficult, decentralizes initiative, and requires combined arms at all levels. Under these conditions narrow spans of control, three to four units are usually appropriate. Three subordinates support initiative in mobile battle, while four subordinates support initiative in more positional battles of attrition. The Army with three maneuver units at most echelons is designed to fight the mobile battles our doctrine demands. The rifle squad, however, probably needs a third fire team and the Army should consider three versus four companies in armor/mechanized battalions. These changes will support leader initiative by providing leaders the control and flexibility to rapidly turn flanks, the opportunity in mobile battles.
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