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Using the two-level game model first proposed by
Robert Putnam in 1988, this book analyzes the impact
of domestic variables (ethnic composition,
institutional constraints, economic development, and
the civil society) on shaping the policy of
intervention in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the
early 1990s by Armenia s first democratically
elected leaders. Then it looks at how the conflict
in Nagorno-Karabakh, in turn, affected the
trajectory of Armenia s transition to democracy. The
discussion of a number of domestic factors
contributing to the failure of democratic
consolidation in post-Soviet Armenia follows.
Parallels are drawn between Armenia and two other
post-socialist countries in the conflict situation,
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, with specific
emphasis on quality of leadership of the elites.
Finally, two early successful anti-communist
democratizers, Armenia and Poland, are compared, and
the later divergence of their political paths is
analyzed.
Robert Putnam in 1988, this book analyzes the impact
of domestic variables (ethnic composition,
institutional constraints, economic development, and
the civil society) on shaping the policy of
intervention in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the
early 1990s by Armenia s first democratically
elected leaders. Then it looks at how the conflict
in Nagorno-Karabakh, in turn, affected the
trajectory of Armenia s transition to democracy. The
discussion of a number of domestic factors
contributing to the failure of democratic
consolidation in post-Soviet Armenia follows.
Parallels are drawn between Armenia and two other
post-socialist countries in the conflict situation,
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, with specific
emphasis on quality of leadership of the elites.
Finally, two early successful anti-communist
democratizers, Armenia and Poland, are compared, and
the later divergence of their political paths is
analyzed.