Bart Streumer defends an error theory that suggests that all moral and other normative judgements are false; and then he argues that we cannot believe this theory. But this need not be a problem: Streumer holds that to make philosophical progress, we need to make a sharp distinction between a theory's truth and our ability to believe it.
Bart Streumer defends an error theory that suggests that all moral and other normative judgements are false; and then he argues that we cannot believe this theory. But this need not be a problem: Streumer holds that to make philosophical progress, we need to make a sharp distinction between a theory's truth and our ability to believe it.
Bart Streumer is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen. He previously taught at the University of Reading. His work on metaethics has appeared in the Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, and the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Inhaltsangabe
1: Normative Judgements and Properties 2: The Reduction Argument 3: Further Versions of the Reduction Argument 4: The False Guarantee and Regress Objections 5: Further Defences of Realism 6: The Symmetry Objection 7: Further Views 8: The Error Theory 9: Believing the Error Theory 10: Reason to Believe the Error Theory 11: Objections, Rejection, Revision 12: Effects, Parallels, Progress Conclusion
1: Normative Judgements and Properties 2: The Reduction Argument 3: Further Versions of the Reduction Argument 4: The False Guarantee and Regress Objections 5: Further Defences of Realism 6: The Symmetry Objection 7: Further Views 8: The Error Theory 9: Believing the Error Theory 10: Reason to Believe the Error Theory 11: Objections, Rejection, Revision 12: Effects, Parallels, Progress Conclusion
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