Why do political actors tolerate courts able to check their power? This book argues that judicial independence as electorally-induced 'insurance' is about the risks of losing power, risks that are higher in autocratic regimes. Using a mixed-methods approach, it develops a theory of both de facto and de jure independence across regime type.
Why do political actors tolerate courts able to check their power? This book argues that judicial independence as electorally-induced 'insurance' is about the risks of losing power, risks that are higher in autocratic regimes. Using a mixed-methods approach, it develops a theory of both de facto and de jure independence across regime type.
Brad Epperly is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina, where he has received the university's highest award for undergraduate teaching. His research on the rule of law appears in numerous journals, including Comparative Political Studies, Perspectives on Politics , and the Journal of Law and Courts.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction 1: The Expected Utility of Insurance 2: The Mechanisms of Insurance 3: Examining Insurance Across Regime Type 4: Integrating de jure Independence 5: Conclusion
Introduction 1: The Expected Utility of Insurance 2: The Mechanisms of Insurance 3: Examining Insurance Across Regime Type 4: Integrating de jure Independence 5: Conclusion
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Shop der buecher.de GmbH & Co. KG Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg Amtsgericht Augsburg HRA 13309