Examines how constitutional requirements of the lawmaking process, and the factional divisions within parties, affect US representatives' decisions on distributing power among themselves.
Examines how constitutional requirements of the lawmaking process, and the factional divisions within parties, affect US representatives' decisions on distributing power among themselves.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Gisela Sin is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. A Fulbright scholar who received her Ph.D. in political science from the University of Michigan, she studies political institutions, emphasizing the strategic elements of separation of powers. She is co-author of a book on Argentinean institutions, Congreso, Presidencia, y Justicia en Argentina (with Guillermo N. Molinelli and Valeria N. Palanza, 1999), and her other work has appeared in such journals as Comparative Political Studies, the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, and Public Choice. She has given presentations at universities and conferences in the United States, Latin America, and Europe.
Inhaltsangabe
1. A constitutional perspective on House organization 2. Constitutional actors and intraparty groups 3. A constitutional theory of House organization 4. Timing of House organizational changes 5. The Senate and White House shadows: centralization and decentralization of the rule of the US House, 1879-2013 6. New rules for an old Speaker: revisiting the 1910 revolt against Speaker Cannon 7. Conclusion Appendix A. Constitutional actors, partisanship, and House majority intraparty groups Appendix B. Theoretical proof Appendix C. List of changes in the rules and procedures of the House Appendix D. The universe of rules-and-procedures coding of the William H. Taft and Calvin Coolidge presidencies Appendix E. Directionality of rules and procedures Appendix F. Senate's ideal point.
1. A constitutional perspective on House organization 2. Constitutional actors and intraparty groups 3. A constitutional theory of House organization 4. Timing of House organizational changes 5. The Senate and White House shadows: centralization and decentralization of the rule of the US House, 1879-2013 6. New rules for an old Speaker: revisiting the 1910 revolt against Speaker Cannon 7. Conclusion Appendix A. Constitutional actors, partisanship, and House majority intraparty groups Appendix B. Theoretical proof Appendix C. List of changes in the rules and procedures of the House Appendix D. The universe of rules-and-procedures coding of the William H. Taft and Calvin Coolidge presidencies Appendix E. Directionality of rules and procedures Appendix F. Senate's ideal point.
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