Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
![Israel and the Peace Process 1977-1982]( "Israel and the Peace Process 1977-1982")
Israel and the Peace Process 1977-198240,99 €![The Remnant Found, or, The Place of Israel's Hiding Discovered]( "The Remnant Found, or, The Place of Israel's Hiding Discovered")
The Remnant Found, or, The Place of Israel's Hiding Discovered21,99 €![Israel's Years of Bogus Grandeur]( "Israel's Years of Bogus Grandeur")
Israel's Years of Bogus Grandeur26,99 €![Israel's Edge]( "Israel's Edge")
Israel's Edge16,99 €![The Falklands War 1982]( "The Falklands War 1982")
The Falklands War 198220,99 €![The History of ESCI: Kits, Figures and Toys: 1967-2000]( "The History of ESCI: Kits, Figures and Toys: 1967-2000")
The History of ESCI: Kits, Figures and Toys: 1967-200026,99 €![Air War in the Falklands 1982]( "Air War in the Falklands 1982")
Air War in the Falklands 198221,99 €
The study serves as a cautionary tale for all who might be tempted to win political fruits against weaker opponents through the application of conventional military might. Using Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the study explains why the modern state of Israel, which had won numerous wars, was unable to defeat militarily inferior foes during its involvement in Lebanon from 1978 to 2000. The author illustrates vital insight into the broader question of outcomes in wars, providing strategic accounts of Israel's military involvement. The Israeli case lasted twenty-two years, and in that time, it was not able to find the formula to end the conflict once and for all; its pullout in 2000 left vital strategic problems unaddressed. Israel's pullout, however, makes the case more enticing because there is a start point and an endpoint from which to consider Israeli military involvement in Lebanon.