Y. Narahari, Dinesh Garg, Ramasuri Narayanam

Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

The focus of this monograph is to explore game theoretic modeling and mechanism design for problem solving in Internet and network economics. The monograph is structured into two parts. The first part (Chapter 2) contains an overview of foundational concepts and key results in mechanism design. This chapter is intended as a self-sufficient introduction to mechanism design theory with the help of numerous stylized examples from network economics. The second part of the monograph contains an exposition of representative game theoretic problems in three different network economics situations and a systematic exploration of mechanism design solutions to these problems. This part has three chapters: Chapter 3 deals with the sponsored search auction problem, Chapter 4 with the resource allocation problem in computational grids, and Chapter 5 with the robust broadcast protocol design problem in ad hoc networks. The monograph concludes with Chapter 6 which provides several pointers to the relevant literature to facilitate a deeper and broader investigation of problem solving with mechanism design.

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With the advent of the Internet and other modern information and communication technologies, a magnificent opportunity has opened up for introducing new, innovative models of commerce, markets, and business. Creating these innovations calls for significant interdisciplinary interaction among researchers in computer science, communication networks, operations research, economics, mathematics, sociology, and management science. In the emerging era of new problems and challenges, one particular tool that has found widespread applications is mechanism design.

The focus of this book is to explore game theoretic modeling and mechanism design for problem solving in Internet and network economics. It provides a sound foundation of relevant concepts and theory, to help apply mechanism design to problem solving in a rigorous way.

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Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.

Produktdetails

• Advanced Information and Knowledge Processing
• Verlag: Springer / Springer London / Springer, Berlin
• Artikelnr. des Verlages: 12119929, 978-1-84800-937-0
• 2009 edition
• Seitenzahl: 274
• Erscheinungstermin: 12. Februar 2009
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 18mm
• Gewicht: 599g
• ISBN-13: 9781848009370
• ISBN-10: 1848009372
• Artikelnr.: 25915335

Inhaltsangabe

From the contents Motivating Problems in Network Economics.- Foundations of Mechanisms Design.- Strategic Form Games.- Dominant Strategy Equilibria.- Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium.- Bayesian Games.- Social Choice Functions.- Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Theorem.- Properties of Social Choice Functions.- Bayesian Implementation.- Revenue Equivalence Theorem.- Mechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions.- Internet Advertising.- Sponsored Search Auction.- Individual Rationality.- Computational Complexity.- Mechanism Design for Resource Procurement in Grid Computing.- The G-DSIC Mechanism.- The G-BIC Mechanism.- G-OPT: An Optimal Auction Mechanism.- Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocols for Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes.- Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes.- Relevant Work on Incentive Compatible Protocols.- A Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol.- A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) Protocol.- Key Applications Areas.

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From the contents Motivating Problems in Network Economics.- Foundations of Mechanisms Design.- Strategic Form Games.- Dominant Strategy Equilibria.- Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium.- Bayesian Games.- Social Choice Functions.- Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Theorem.- Properties of Social Choice Functions.- Bayesian Implementation.- Revenue Equivalence Theorem.- Mechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions.- Internet Advertising.- Sponsored Search Auction.- Individual Rationality.- Computational Complexity.- Mechanism Design for Resource Procurement in Grid Computing.- The G-DSIC Mechanism.- The G-BIC Mechanism.- G-OPT: An Optimal Auction Mechanism.- Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocols for Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes.- Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes.- Relevant Work on Incentive Compatible Protocols.- A Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol.- A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) Protocol.- Key Applications Areas.

Rezensionen

"The book consists of six chapters. ... This is one of the first monographs that deals solely with algorithmic mechanism design. ... it will be useful to researchers in computer science, operations research, e-commerce, and multiagent systems. The book is also suitable for an advanced undergraduate or graduate-level course in computer science and operations research. ... In any case, the book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers." (Haris Aziz, ACM Computing Reviews, April, 2009)

From the reviews: "The book consists of six chapters. ... This is one of the first monographs that deals solely with algorithmic mechanism design. ... it will be useful to researchers in computer science, operations research, e-commerce, and multiagent systems. The book is also suitable for an advanced undergraduate or graduate-level course in computer science and operations research. ... In any case, the book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers." (Haris Aziz, ACM Computing Reviews, April, 2009)