In Bureaucracy's Masters and Minions the author argues that political control of the bureaucracy from the president and the Congress is largely contingent on an agency's internal characteristics of workforce composition, workforce responsibilities, and workforce organization.
In Bureaucracy's Masters and Minions the author argues that political control of the bureaucracy from the president and the Congress is largely contingent on an agency's internal characteristics of workforce composition, workforce responsibilities, and workforce organization.
Eleanor L. Schiff is visiting assistant professor of political science at Bucknell University.
Inhaltsangabe
Chapter 1: Bureaucracy as a Whipping Boy for Politicians and Citizens Alike Chapter 2: A Survey on Bureaucratic Control Mechanisms Chapter 3: The Business of Agency Budgeting: Incrementalism Chapter 4: Reflecting, Refining and Revising the Principal-Agent Approach: an Agent-Principal Model Chapter 5: Using an Agent-Principal Model to Test Who Controls the U.S. Bureaucracy Chapter 6: Elite Education: Understanding the Dynamics of K-12 Education Policy Changes Chapter 7: Bureaucratic Control, Intransigence, and Fortitude
Chapter 1: Bureaucracy as a Whipping Boy for Politicians and Citizens Alike Chapter 2: A Survey on Bureaucratic Control Mechanisms Chapter 3: The Business of Agency Budgeting: Incrementalism Chapter 4: Reflecting, Refining and Revising the Principal-Agent Approach: an Agent-Principal Model Chapter 5: Using an Agent-Principal Model to Test Who Controls the U.S. Bureaucracy Chapter 6: Elite Education: Understanding the Dynamics of K-12 Education Policy Changes Chapter 7: Bureaucratic Control, Intransigence, and Fortitude
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