This book compares the conflicting claims of mindism and personism and argues for placing persons at the center of philosophy of mind. It examines functionalism as it is presented in Fodor's early work and investigates various attempts to nullify the concept of person.
This book compares the conflicting claims of mindism and personism and argues for placing persons at the center of philosophy of mind. It examines functionalism as it is presented in Fodor's early work and investigates various attempts to nullify the concept of person.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Elmer Sprague is professor emeritus at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, where he taught philosophy for 44 years. He has a B.A. from the University of Nebraska, and a B.A. and D.Phil. from Oxford. He was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford (1948-51), and was the Paul Robert and Jean Shuman Hanna Professor of Philosophy at Hamline University (1987). His previous publications include articles on Ryle and Hume, and the book, Metaphysical Thinking.
Inhaltsangabe
Part I Mindism and Personism Mindism and Personism Descartes's Concept of Mind Un Locke ing the Mind A Wittgensteinian Philosophy of Mind Ryle, Mind, and Persons Wittgenstein and Ryle Part II Personism and Mindism Mental Events? Functionalism Giving Persons a Hard Time Consciousness
Part I Mindism and Personism Mindism and Personism Descartes's Concept of Mind Un Locke ing the Mind A Wittgensteinian Philosophy of Mind Ryle, Mind, and Persons Wittgenstein and Ryle Part II Personism and Mindism Mental Events? Functionalism Giving Persons a Hard Time Consciousness
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