This is the first book on group polarization from a philosophical perspective. The authors compare four models of group polarization to address important metaphysical and epistemological questions related to the phenomenon. Ultimately, the authors defend a collective vice model of group polarization over the competing alternatives.
This is the first book on group polarization from a philosophical perspective. The authors compare four models of group polarization to address important metaphysical and epistemological questions related to the phenomenon. Ultimately, the authors defend a collective vice model of group polarization over the competing alternatives.
Fernando Broncano-Berrocal is a Ramón y Cajal fellow at the University of Barcelona, Spain. He works mainly in epistemology, with an emphasis on virtue epistemology, philosophy of luck, social epistemology, and collective epistemology. He is the co-editor, with J. Adam Carter, of The Epistemology of Group Disagreement (Routledge, 2021). His work has appeared in such places as Philosophical Studies, Analysis, Synthese , and Erkenntnis . J. Adam Carter is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, UK. His expertise is mainly in epistemology with particular focus on virtue epistemology, social epistemology, relativism, know-how, epistemic luck, and epistemic defeat. He is the author of Metaepistemology and Relativism (2016), co-author of A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How (2018), and co-editor, with Fernando Broncano- Berrocal, of The Epistemology of Group Disagreement (Routledge, 2021). His work has appeared in Noûs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophical Studies, Analysis , and the Australasian Journal of Philosophy .
Inhaltsangabe
Preface Chapter 1. The Philosophy of Polarization Phenomena Chapter 2. The Psychology of Group Polarization Chapter 3. The Epistemology of Group Polarization Chapter 4. Four Models of Group Polarization Chapter 5. The Reductive Virtue/Vice Model Chapter 6. The Collective Heuristic/Bias Model Chapter 7. The Reductive Heuristic/Bias Model Chapter 8. The Collective Virtue/Vice Model Chapter 9. Mitigating the Epistemic Pitfalls of Group Polarization Conclusion: Future Directions
Preface
Chapter 1. The Philosophy of Polarization Phenomena
Chapter 2. The Psychology of Group Polarization
Chapter 3. The Epistemology of Group Polarization
Chapter 4. Four Models of Group Polarization
Chapter 5. The Reductive Virtue/Vice Model
Chapter 6. The Collective Heuristic/Bias Model
Chapter 7. The Reductive Heuristic/Bias Model
Chapter 8. The Collective Virtue/Vice Model
Chapter 9. Mitigating the Epistemic Pitfalls of Group Polarization
Preface Chapter 1. The Philosophy of Polarization Phenomena Chapter 2. The Psychology of Group Polarization Chapter 3. The Epistemology of Group Polarization Chapter 4. Four Models of Group Polarization Chapter 5. The Reductive Virtue/Vice Model Chapter 6. The Collective Heuristic/Bias Model Chapter 7. The Reductive Heuristic/Bias Model Chapter 8. The Collective Virtue/Vice Model Chapter 9. Mitigating the Epistemic Pitfalls of Group Polarization Conclusion: Future Directions
Preface
Chapter 1. The Philosophy of Polarization Phenomena
Chapter 2. The Psychology of Group Polarization
Chapter 3. The Epistemology of Group Polarization
Chapter 4. Four Models of Group Polarization
Chapter 5. The Reductive Virtue/Vice Model
Chapter 6. The Collective Heuristic/Bias Model
Chapter 7. The Reductive Heuristic/Bias Model
Chapter 8. The Collective Virtue/Vice Model
Chapter 9. Mitigating the Epistemic Pitfalls of Group Polarization
Conclusion: Future Directions
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