Kevin Leyton-Brown, Yoav Shoham

Essentials of Game Theory

A Concise Multidisciplinary Introduction

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Game theory is the mathematical study of interaction among independent, self-interested agents. The audience for game theory has grown dramatically in recent years, and now spans disciplines as diverse as political science, biology, psychology, economics, linguistics, sociology, and computer science, among others. What has been missing is a relatively short introduction to the field covering the common basis that anyone with a professional interest in game theory is likely to require. Such a text would minimize notation, ruthlessly focus on essentials, and yet not sacrifice rigor. This Synthesis Lecture aims to fill this gap by providing a concise and accessible introduction to the field. It covers the main classes of games, their representations, and the main concepts used to analyze them.

Produktdetails

• Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning
• Verlag: Morgan & Claypool / Springer / Springer International Publishing / Springer, Berlin
• Artikelnr. des Verlages: 978-3-031-00417-9
• Seitenzahl: 108
• Erscheinungstermin: 4. Juni 2008
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 235mm x 191mm x 7mm
• Gewicht: 219g
• ISBN-13: 9783031004179
• ISBN-10: 3031004175
• Artikelnr.: 64150449

Autorenporträt

Kevin Leyton-Brown is a professor of Computer Science at the University of British Columbia and an associate member of the Vancouver School of Economics. He holds a PhD and M.Sc. from Stanford University (2003; 2001) and a B.Sc. from McMaster University (1998). He studies the intersection of computer science and microeconomics, addressing computational problems in economic contexts and incentive issues in multiagent systems. He also applies machine learning to the automated design and analysis of algorithms for solving hard computational problems.

Inhaltsangabe

Games in Normal Form.- Analyzing Games: From Optimality to Equilibrium.- Further Solution Concepts for Normal-Form Games.- Games with Sequential Actions: The Perfect-information Extensive Form.- Generalizing the Extensive Form: Imperfect-Information Games.- Repeated and Stochastic Games.- Uncertainty about Payoffs: Bayesian Games.- Coalitional Game Theory.- History and References.- Index.