'This book examines a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning. Topics include interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing
'This book examines a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning. Topics include interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing
H. Peyton Young is Senior Fellow in Economic Studies and Governance Studies and Co-Director of the Center on Social and Economic Dynamics at the Brookings Institution. He is also Scott and Barbara Black Professor of Economics at Johns Hopkins University and a Member of the Science Steering Committee at the Santa Fe Institute. His main areas of research and expertise are game theory, the design of legislative systems, public sector pricing, social norms, and public policy, in all of which he has published extensively.
Inhaltsangabe
1: The Interactive Learning Problem 2: Reinforcement and Regret 3: Equilibrium 4: Conditional No-Regret Learning 5: Prediction, Postdiction, and Calibration 6: Fictitious Play and Its Variants 7: Bayesian Learning 8: Hypothesis Testing 9: Conclusion
1: The Interactive Learning Problem 2: Reinforcement and Regret 3: Equilibrium 4: Conditional No-Regret Learning 5: Prediction, Postdiction, and Calibration 6: Fictitious Play and Its Variants 7: Bayesian Learning 8: Hypothesis Testing 9: Conclusion
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