America's Last Battles: Organizing Brigades to Win the Peace 14 Lessons from East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq
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This study strives to determine the most effective way to organize and train a military force at the brigade level and below to build peace during contested peace operations. The thesis investigates three organizational models for military forces. In the East Timor case, the New Zealand Defense Force employs their unit 's internal civil affairs teams to focus a battalion 's resources on village-level security, governance, and economy simultaneously. In the Afghanistan case, the U.S. Army employs a light infantry brigade combat team to focus exclusively on security, and separate civil affairs e...
This study strives to determine the most effective way to organize and train a military force at the brigade level and below to build peace during contested peace operations. The thesis investigates three organizational models for military forces. In the East Timor case, the New Zealand Defense Force employs their unit 's internal civil affairs teams to focus a battalion 's resources on village-level security, governance, and economy simultaneously. In the Afghanistan case, the U.S. Army employs a light infantry brigade combat team to focus exclusively on security, and separate civil affairs elements to conduct very minimal local governance and economy operations. In the Iraq case, an Airborne brigade combat team employs its attached civil affairs teams internal to the brigade and functionally organizes the entire brigade to tackle security, governance, and economic challenges at the city and village level. Findings suggest that brigades must have an internal organization that facilitates simultaneous promotion of security, governance, and economy. The recommendations include the use of field artillery and air defense artillery units in a multifunctional civil affairs role within the new units of action. Further, evidence indicates that the resource focus should be at the local rather than the national level. Lastly, the conclusion recommends how to change Army culture as a necessary prerequisite to lasting reorganization.
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