This book uses game theory to explain conflict between individual self-interested behavior and cooperation in economic markets, lawsuits, and legislative bodies. It demonstrates the need for social regulation in addition to free markets and judicial decisions in common law cases.
This book uses game theory to explain conflict between individual self-interested behavior and cooperation in economic markets, lawsuits, and legislative bodies. It demonstrates the need for social regulation in addition to free markets and judicial decisions in common law cases.
John Cirace is professor of economics and business law at Lehman College, CUNY, and adjunct professor of law at Brooklyn Law School.
Inhaltsangabe
Acknowledgments Illustrations Introduction Part I: When are Thinking like an Economist and Thinking like a Lawyer Consistent? Chapter 1: Pareto Efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks Criterion Compared Chapter 2: Rational Economic Behavior and Logic Defined Chapter 3: Judicial Use of Economic Rationality (Efficiency) Chapter 4: Equal Protection and Lexical Constraints on Efficiency Chapter 5: Legal Rationality and Logic Defined Chapter 6: When are Law and Economics Consistent (Isomorphic)? Part II: Providing Infrastructure and Controlling Externalities Requires Resolving Conflicts between Individual Self-Interest and Cooperation Chapter 7: Prisoners' Dilemma and Introduction to Game Theory Chapter 8: Market and Government Failures as Prisoners' Dilemmas Chapter 9: Five Requirements for Competitive Markets Chapter 10: In the Long Run We Are All Dead Part III: General Case vs. Hard Case Methodologies: Rottenberg, Coase, Calabresi, and Posner Chapter 11: Rottenberg's Theorem: Effect of a Change in Property Rights on Free Markets Chapter 12: Coase's Theorems: Effect of Property Rights and Liability Rules on Mutually Interfering Activities Chapter 13: Calabresi's Criteria for Allocating Accident Costs Common to Several Activities Chapter 14: Posner's Economic Analysis of the Common Law Part IV: Risk, Insurance, and Incomplete Information Chapter 15: Risk, Insurance, Judge Hand Test, and Value of a Statistical Life Chapter 16: Incomplete Information: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Principal-Agent Problem Part V: Law and Economics of Civil Obligation Chapter 17: Game Theoretic Framework for Law and Economics of Civil Obligation Chapter 18: Torts: Negligence and Products Liability Chapter 19: Strict Rules, Competitive Market Contract Model Chapter 20: Discretionary Standards, Imperfect Competition Contract Model Chapter 21: Decision Theory, Suit, and Settlement Bibliography About the Author
Acknowledgments Illustrations Introduction Part I: When are Thinking like an Economist and Thinking like a Lawyer Consistent? Chapter 1: Pareto Efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks Criterion Compared Chapter 2: Rational Economic Behavior and Logic Defined Chapter 3: Judicial Use of Economic Rationality (Efficiency) Chapter 4: Equal Protection and Lexical Constraints on Efficiency Chapter 5: Legal Rationality and Logic Defined Chapter 6: When are Law and Economics Consistent (Isomorphic)? Part II: Providing Infrastructure and Controlling Externalities Requires Resolving Conflicts between Individual Self-Interest and Cooperation Chapter 7: Prisoners' Dilemma and Introduction to Game Theory Chapter 8: Market and Government Failures as Prisoners' Dilemmas Chapter 9: Five Requirements for Competitive Markets Chapter 10: In the Long Run We Are All Dead Part III: General Case vs. Hard Case Methodologies: Rottenberg, Coase, Calabresi, and Posner Chapter 11: Rottenberg's Theorem: Effect of a Change in Property Rights on Free Markets Chapter 12: Coase's Theorems: Effect of Property Rights and Liability Rules on Mutually Interfering Activities Chapter 13: Calabresi's Criteria for Allocating Accident Costs Common to Several Activities Chapter 14: Posner's Economic Analysis of the Common Law Part IV: Risk, Insurance, and Incomplete Information Chapter 15: Risk, Insurance, Judge Hand Test, and Value of a Statistical Life Chapter 16: Incomplete Information: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Principal-Agent Problem Part V: Law and Economics of Civil Obligation Chapter 17: Game Theoretic Framework for Law and Economics of Civil Obligation Chapter 18: Torts: Negligence and Products Liability Chapter 19: Strict Rules, Competitive Market Contract Model Chapter 20: Discretionary Standards, Imperfect Competition Contract Model Chapter 21: Decision Theory, Suit, and Settlement Bibliography About the Author
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