Deterrence theory emerged during the Cold War in response to the threats posed by nuclear weapons. Today, strategists must consider many other threats, such as cyber attacks, drones, space weapons, and subversion, all within a highly interdependent global economy. While many policymakers aspire to create integrated deterrence strategies, deterrence is not a panacea for complexity. Elements of Deterrence presents detailed arguments and empirical evidence demonstrating that the practice of deterrence involves complex trade-offs between multiple political goals and specialized military…mehr
Deterrence theory emerged during the Cold War in response to the threats posed by nuclear weapons. Today, strategists must consider many other threats, such as cyber attacks, drones, space weapons, and subversion, all within a highly interdependent global economy. While many policymakers aspire to create integrated deterrence strategies, deterrence is not a panacea for complexity. Elements of Deterrence presents detailed arguments and empirical evidence demonstrating that the practice of deterrence involves complex trade-offs between multiple political goals and specialized military instruments. The result is a new synthesis of venerable themes in deterrence theory.
Erik Gartzke is Professor of Political Science and the Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies (cPASS) at the University of California, San Diego. Jon R. Lindsay is Associate Professor at the School of Cybersecurity and Privacy and the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology.
Inhaltsangabe
Biographies Acknowledgements List of Figures and Tables Ch. 1 Introduction: Revisiting Deterrence Theory I The Means and Ends of Deterrence Ch. 2 What is Deterrence? Ch. 3 Deterrence is Not (Just) One Thing Ch. 4 Politics by (Many) Other Means II Theoretical Problems in the Cyber Domain Ch. 5 Cyberspace is Unsuitable for the Strategy of War Ch. 6 Cyberspace is Ideal for the Strategy of Deception Ch. 7 Cyber Deception Versus Nuclear Deterrence III Empirical Evidence in Multiple Domains Ch. 8 Land: Presence and Credibility with Koji Kagotani Ch. 9 Sea: Maneuver and Uncertainty Ch. 10 Air: Automation and Cost with James Walsh Ch. 11 Space: Intelligence and Stability with Bryan Early IV Strategic Implications of Complexity Ch. 12 Trade: Asymmetry and Multipolarity with Oliver Westerwinter Ch. 13 Cyber: Complements and Substitutes with Nadiya Kostyuk Ch. 14 Gray Zone: Ambiguity and Escalation with J. Andres Gannon and Peter Schram Ch. 15 Conclusion: Summary and Implications Bibliography
Biographies Acknowledgements List of Figures and Tables Ch. 1 Introduction: Revisiting Deterrence Theory I The Means and Ends of Deterrence Ch. 2 What is Deterrence? Ch. 3 Deterrence is Not (Just) One Thing Ch. 4 Politics by (Many) Other Means II Theoretical Problems in the Cyber Domain Ch. 5 Cyberspace is Unsuitable for the Strategy of War Ch. 6 Cyberspace is Ideal for the Strategy of Deception Ch. 7 Cyber Deception Versus Nuclear Deterrence III Empirical Evidence in Multiple Domains Ch. 8 Land: Presence and Credibility with Koji Kagotani Ch. 9 Sea: Maneuver and Uncertainty Ch. 10 Air: Automation and Cost with James Walsh Ch. 11 Space: Intelligence and Stability with Bryan Early IV Strategic Implications of Complexity Ch. 12 Trade: Asymmetry and Multipolarity with Oliver Westerwinter Ch. 13 Cyber: Complements and Substitutes with Nadiya Kostyuk Ch. 14 Gray Zone: Ambiguity and Escalation with J. Andres Gannon and Peter Schram Ch. 15 Conclusion: Summary and Implications Bibliography
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