Why do some governments borrow from China, while others borrow from the United States or the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? This book systematically explains how governments choose among competing loan offers. As the strings attached to loans vary across creditors, domestic interest groups prefer one type of creditor to the other. However, interest groups disagree about which creditor is preferable. Governments cater to whichever domestic interest group coalition is dominant by borrowing from the coalition's preferred creditor. The book offers evidence from Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia as…mehr
Why do some governments borrow from China, while others borrow from the United States or the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? This book systematically explains how governments choose among competing loan offers. As the strings attached to loans vary across creditors, domestic interest groups prefer one type of creditor to the other. However, interest groups disagree about which creditor is preferable. Governments cater to whichever domestic interest group coalition is dominant by borrowing from the coalition's preferred creditor. The book offers evidence from Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia as well as an extensive statistical analysis. The results show that borrowing portfolios around the world reflect the relative strength of societal interest groups.
Jonas B. Bunte is Assistant Professor of Political Economy at the University of Texas at Dallas. He studies the politics of finance and development. His work has appeared in the British Journal of Political Science, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Peace Research, World Development, Review of International Political Economy, and elsewhere. He received his PhD in Political Science from the University of Minnesota.
Inhaltsangabe
Acknowledgements Dedication List of Tables List of Figures 1 Explaining Variation in Borrowing Portfolios 2 How Governments Choose Their Creditors I Qualitative Evidence 3 Tracing the Process of Borrowing with Fieldwork 4 Ecuador: A Corporatist Coalition chooses BRIC loans 5 Colombia: A Capital Coalition prefers Private Creditors 6 Peru: A Consumer Coalition wants Western Creditors II Quantitative Evidence 7 Generalizing the Findings with Statistical Analyses 8 Measuring Borrowing Portfolios and Group Strength 9 Governments' Borrowing Decisions across the Developing World 10 Evaluating Alternative Explanations 11 Why Greater Choice Matters for Developing Countries Bibliography
Acknowledgements Dedication List of Tables List of Figures 1 Explaining Variation in Borrowing Portfolios 2 How Governments Choose Their Creditors I Qualitative Evidence 3 Tracing the Process of Borrowing with Fieldwork 4 Ecuador: A Corporatist Coalition chooses BRIC loans 5 Colombia: A Capital Coalition prefers Private Creditors 6 Peru: A Consumer Coalition wants Western Creditors II Quantitative Evidence 7 Generalizing the Findings with Statistical Analyses 8 Measuring Borrowing Portfolios and Group Strength 9 Governments' Borrowing Decisions across the Developing World 10 Evaluating Alternative Explanations 11 Why Greater Choice Matters for Developing Countries Bibliography
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