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The subject of the book is to apply microeconometric
techniques to labor economics and criminal behavior.
Chapter one builds and estimates an econometric model
of recidivism for the USA using data set of released
prisoners from state prisons in 1983. The chapter
extends the literature on the application
of econometrics to criminal behavior by treating the
process of recidivism as a competing
risks model where dependence arises from unobserved
heterogeneity.
Chapter two evaluates the effect of a reemployment
program for ex-convicts on recidivism behavior. The
econometric model has to deal with the following
institutional
aspects of the program. First, upon release, each
ex-inmate looks for a job. Second, at the same
release-time the ex-criminal
could commit a crime, i.e., recidivate. Third, the
difference
between controls and treatments samples only occurs
conditional on finding a
job. Hence, the timing of receiving the treatment is
random and endogenous. This chapter extends the
literature
on econometric program evaluation by building and
estimating a model that considers
the conditional feature of the treatment. The results
show that the program helps reduce criminal
activity.
techniques to labor economics and criminal behavior.
Chapter one builds and estimates an econometric model
of recidivism for the USA using data set of released
prisoners from state prisons in 1983. The chapter
extends the literature on the application
of econometrics to criminal behavior by treating the
process of recidivism as a competing
risks model where dependence arises from unobserved
heterogeneity.
Chapter two evaluates the effect of a reemployment
program for ex-convicts on recidivism behavior. The
econometric model has to deal with the following
institutional
aspects of the program. First, upon release, each
ex-inmate looks for a job. Second, at the same
release-time the ex-criminal
could commit a crime, i.e., recidivate. Third, the
difference
between controls and treatments samples only occurs
conditional on finding a
job. Hence, the timing of receiving the treatment is
random and endogenous. This chapter extends the
literature
on econometric program evaluation by building and
estimating a model that considers
the conditional feature of the treatment. The results
show that the program helps reduce criminal
activity.