This study examines the suitability of current U.S. military assistance to Philippine ground forces. The research hypothesis is that the scope and form of current military assistance to the Philippines is not optimum and that more, or different, aid is warranted. The study profiles the communist insurgency, the Aquino administration's counterinsurgency policies, and the composition of AFP ground forces and their counterinsurgency programs. It investigates and analyzes the extent of U.S. military aid, both direct and indirect. The study concludes that the insurgency presents a real and immediate threat to the Aquino administration, and that the Aquino administration has no clear national COIN strategy integrating civil and military efforts. It further concludes that both the U.S. and the AFP may optimize U.S. aid by adopting several initiatives; and that the use of U.S. advisors is appropriate only in a limited "train-the-trainer" role.
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Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.