When Cities Lobby tells the story of what happens when local officials rely on professional lobbyists to represent their interests in state government. In a political environment characterized by intense urban-rural polarization and growing hostility between cities and state legislatures, lobbying has emerged as an important tool to amplify urban and progressive voices. But high-income suburbs have also figured out how to strategically use lobbyists to secure state funding. When Cities Lobby highlights the costs and benefits of intergovernmental advocacy and explores the consequences for representation and democratic policymaking in the 21st century.…mehr
When Cities Lobby tells the story of what happens when local officials rely on professional lobbyists to represent their interests in state government. In a political environment characterized by intense urban-rural polarization and growing hostility between cities and state legislatures, lobbying has emerged as an important tool to amplify urban and progressive voices. But high-income suburbs have also figured out how to strategically use lobbyists to secure state funding. When Cities Lobby highlights the costs and benefits of intergovernmental advocacy and explores the consequences for representation and democratic policymaking in the 21st century.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Julia Payson is an Assistant Professor of Politics at New York University.
Inhaltsangabe
* 1 Introduction * 2 The State of Local Lobbying * 2.1 Using Disclosure Data to Document Local Influence * 2.2 Targeting the State vs. Federal Government * 2.3 Who Advocates for Cities? * 2.4 Where Cities Lobby * 2.5 What Cities Want * 2.6 Allocating Lobbying Effort: Evidence from Florida * 2.7 Banding Together or Going It Alone? The Role of Municipal Leagues * 2.8 Discussion * 3 How City Lobbyists Bridge Representational Gaps * 3.1 Why Do Organized Interests Lobby? * 3.2 How Local Governments Are Different * 3.3 Predicting Lobbying Across Cities * 3.4 Too Much Representation? Redistricting and Lobbying * 3.5 Partisan Mismatches and City Lobbying * 3.6 The Unique Challenges of Conservative Representation * 3.7 District Based or Collective Representation? Evidence From Missouri * 3.8 Discussion * 4 Exploring Municipal Mobilization Across States * 4.1 What We Know About Variation in State Level Lobbying * 4.2 Political Geography and Municipal Lobbying * 4.3 Lobbying in Response to Institutional Complexity * 4.4 The Political Environment * 4.5 State Transfers to Cities Increases Lobbying And Vice Versa * 4.6 Current Policy Debates * 4.7 Discussion * 5 Who Gets What? City Lobbying And State Transfers * 5.1 Is Lobbying a Good Investment for Cities? * 5.2 Using State Transfers to Estimate The Returns Lobbying * 5.3 Lobbying Increases State Funding * 5.4 Funding Follows Lobbying (Not Vice Versa) * 5.5 Why Lobbying Benefits Rich Cities * 5.6 Discussion * 6 City vs. State: Power, Policy, and Preemption * 6.1 How Lobbying Shapes The Distribution of State Funding * 6.2 Case Studies: Cities and State Preemption * 6.3 The Rise of State Preemption * 6.4 How Cities Are Responding * 6.5 What Do City Lobbying Efforts Against Preemption Look Like? * 6.6 Discussion * 7 Conclusion: Why Cities Lobby and Why It Matters * 7.1 Conservative Critiques of Municipal Lobbying * 7.2 Does Municipal Lobbying Exacerbate Inequality? * 7.3 Intergovernmental Lobbying and Democratic Representation * 7.4 The View From Above and Below * 7.5 Prospects For Reform * 8 Appendices * Bibliography
* 1 Introduction * 2 The State of Local Lobbying * 2.1 Using Disclosure Data to Document Local Influence * 2.2 Targeting the State vs. Federal Government * 2.3 Who Advocates for Cities? * 2.4 Where Cities Lobby * 2.5 What Cities Want * 2.6 Allocating Lobbying Effort: Evidence from Florida * 2.7 Banding Together or Going It Alone? The Role of Municipal Leagues * 2.8 Discussion * 3 How City Lobbyists Bridge Representational Gaps * 3.1 Why Do Organized Interests Lobby? * 3.2 How Local Governments Are Different * 3.3 Predicting Lobbying Across Cities * 3.4 Too Much Representation? Redistricting and Lobbying * 3.5 Partisan Mismatches and City Lobbying * 3.6 The Unique Challenges of Conservative Representation * 3.7 District Based or Collective Representation? Evidence From Missouri * 3.8 Discussion * 4 Exploring Municipal Mobilization Across States * 4.1 What We Know About Variation in State Level Lobbying * 4.2 Political Geography and Municipal Lobbying * 4.3 Lobbying in Response to Institutional Complexity * 4.4 The Political Environment * 4.5 State Transfers to Cities Increases Lobbying And Vice Versa * 4.6 Current Policy Debates * 4.7 Discussion * 5 Who Gets What? City Lobbying And State Transfers * 5.1 Is Lobbying a Good Investment for Cities? * 5.2 Using State Transfers to Estimate The Returns Lobbying * 5.3 Lobbying Increases State Funding * 5.4 Funding Follows Lobbying (Not Vice Versa) * 5.5 Why Lobbying Benefits Rich Cities * 5.6 Discussion * 6 City vs. State: Power, Policy, and Preemption * 6.1 How Lobbying Shapes The Distribution of State Funding * 6.2 Case Studies: Cities and State Preemption * 6.3 The Rise of State Preemption * 6.4 How Cities Are Responding * 6.5 What Do City Lobbying Efforts Against Preemption Look Like? * 6.6 Discussion * 7 Conclusion: Why Cities Lobby and Why It Matters * 7.1 Conservative Critiques of Municipal Lobbying * 7.2 Does Municipal Lobbying Exacerbate Inequality? * 7.3 Intergovernmental Lobbying and Democratic Representation * 7.4 The View From Above and Below * 7.5 Prospects For Reform * 8 Appendices * Bibliography
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