How fragile is our knowledge of morality, compared to other kinds of knowledge? Does knowledge of the difference between right and wrong fundamentally differ from knowledge of other kinds? Sarah McGrath offers new answers to these questions as she explores the possibilities, sources and characteristic vulnerabilities of moral knowledge.
How fragile is our knowledge of morality, compared to other kinds of knowledge? Does knowledge of the difference between right and wrong fundamentally differ from knowledge of other kinds? Sarah McGrath offers new answers to these questions as she explores the possibilities, sources and characteristic vulnerabilities of moral knowledge.
Sarah McGrath is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. She has written extensively on moral disagreement, moral testimony, moral expertise, and also about issues at the intersection of metaphysics and ethics. Her published work on these topics has appeared in leading philosophy publications, including The Journal of Philosophy, Ethics, and the Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
Inhaltsangabe
1: Introduction 2: Reflective Equilibrium, its virtues and its limits 3: Moral Knowledge from Others 4: Observation and Experience 5: Losing Moral Knowledge 6: Conclusions
1: Introduction 2: Reflective Equilibrium, its virtues and its limits 3: Moral Knowledge from Others 4: Observation and Experience 5: Losing Moral Knowledge 6: Conclusions
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