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The problem examined in this research paper addresses the potential impact to the U.S. Navy with the elimination of the MH-53E regarding the AMCM/ heavy lift capability. Research methodology used was the problem/ solution method. The problem is the Navy is continuing with the development of the MH-60S/R and is planning to eliminate the MH-53E due to cost of operation. The solution for the Navy is to procure a new AMCM/ heavy-lift helicopter to work with the MH-60S. Findings included information regarding the capability of the MH-53E, and the status of the MH-60S and its AMCM systems. Also, the Navy does not have a solid plan to replace the MH-53E with an equivalent heavy lift platform. However, even though the new MH60S and its AMCM systems are behind schedule, the Navy remains committed to their development and testing. There are two main conclusions. First, the MH-60S and its five AMCM weapon systems have not demonstrated that they are capable of performing adequately in the AMCM role for future naval operations. Second, if the Navy does not replace the MH-53E with an equivalent heavy lift helicopter, it will lack the capability to adequately perform unique AMCM, heavy lift fleet support, and humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations.
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Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.