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Under what conditions do we have inferential knowledge? I propose and defend the following principle: S knows that p via inference only if S knows all the premises essentially involved in her inference in support of p - "KFK" for short. Even though KFK is at least tacitly endorsed by many figures in the history of philosophy, from Aristotle through Descartes, and Kant to Bertrand Russell -and, more recently, by David Armstrong - KFK has fallen into disfavor among epistemologists over the past fifty years. In response to Edmund Gettier's legendary paper, many have proposed views according to…mehr

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Under what conditions do we have inferential knowledge? I propose and defend the following principle: S knows that p via inference only if S knows all the premises essentially involved in her inference in support of p - "KFK" for short. Even though KFK is at least tacitly endorsed by many figures in the history of philosophy, from Aristotle through Descartes, and Kant to Bertrand Russell -and, more recently, by David Armstrong - KFK has fallen into disfavor among epistemologists over the past fifty years. In response to Edmund Gettier's legendary paper, many have proposed views according to which one's reasoning is a source of knowledge even if one fails to know some or all premises essentially involved in one's reasoning, while others have given up offering a theory of inferential knowledge and have focused on reasoning as a source of justified belief instead. Unfortunately, these accounts that deal with inferential knowledge are problematic; they cannot, for example, fully explain our common practice of evaluating negatively inferences with unknown premises.