- Gebundenes Buch
- Merkliste
- Auf die Merkliste
- Bewerten Bewerten
- Teilen
- Produkt teilen
- Produkterinnerung
- Produkterinnerung
"Nations have powerful reasons to get their military alliances right. When security pacts go well, they underpin regional and global order; when they go wrong, they can spread wars across continents as states are dragged into conflict. We would, therefore, expect states to carefully tailor their military partnerships to specific conditions. This expectation, Raymond C. Kuo argues, is wrong. Following the Leader argues that most countries ignore their individual security interests in military pacts, instead converging on a single, dominant alliance strategy. The book introduces a new social…mehr
Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
- David M LamptonFollowing the Leader29,99 €
- Michael S DukakisLeader-Managers in the Public Sector68,99 €
- Sikandar HayatThe Charismatic Leader-Quaid-I-Azam M.A. Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan64,99 €
- Implementing the Responsibility to Protect176,99 €
- Reinvigorating the United Nations187,99 €
- Joseph A GaglianoAlliance Decision-Making in the South China Sea182,99 €
- Archie BrownThe Myth of the Strong Leader38,99 €
-
-
-
"Nations have powerful reasons to get their military alliances right. When security pacts go well, they underpin regional and global order; when they go wrong, they can spread wars across continents as states are dragged into conflict. We would, therefore, expect states to carefully tailor their military partnerships to specific conditions. This expectation, Raymond C. Kuo argues, is wrong. Following the Leader argues that most countries ignore their individual security interests in military pacts, instead converging on a single, dominant alliance strategy. The book introduces a new social theory of strategic diffusion and emulation, using case studies and advanced statistical analysis of alliances from 1815 to 2003. In the wake of each major war that shatters the international system, a new hegemon creates a core military partnership to target its greatest enemy. Secondary and peripheral countries rush to emulate this alliance, illustrating their credibility and prestige by mimicking the dominant form. Be it the NATO model that seems so commonsense today, or the realpolitik that reigned in Europe of the late nineteenth century, a lone alliance strategy has defined broad swaths of diplomatic history. It is not states' own security interests driving this phenomenon, Kuo shows, but their jockeying for status in a world periodically remade by great powers"--
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Stanford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 224
- Erscheinungstermin: 3. August 2021
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 230mm x 154mm x 20mm
- Gewicht: 476g
- ISBN-13: 9781503628434
- ISBN-10: 1503628434
- Artikelnr.: 60105531
- Verlag: Stanford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 224
- Erscheinungstermin: 3. August 2021
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 230mm x 154mm x 20mm
- Gewicht: 476g
- ISBN-13: 9781503628434
- ISBN-10: 1503628434
- Artikelnr.: 60105531
Raymond C. Kuo is an independent political scientist.
Contents and Abstracts
1Transhistorical Patterns in Alliance Strategy
chapter abstract
Given the dangers of war, states should carefully tailor their alliances to
specific threats and constraints. We expect wide variety in security
strategies and pact designs. This expectation is wrong. In any year, 75
percent of states pursue identical alliance strategies. Why do countries
ignore their individuated conditions and converge on a single dominant
alliance strategy? This chapter presents the book's puzzle, describing
patterns in alliance design from 1715-2003.
2The Theory of Strategic Alliance Diffusion
chapter abstract
This chapter offers a social theory of diffusion to explain the dominant
alliance strategy. Major wars shatter the international system. Into this
breach, a new hegemon creates a core pact targeting its central security
challenge. This partnership becomes the standard for credible and
legitimate security policy in the postwar environment. Secondary countries
copy its strategy to demonstrate the credibility of their own alliances.
Peripheral nations emulate to acquire international status and prestige.
3The Diffusion of Alliance Strategy: Systemic Patterns and Evidence
chapter abstract
This chapter uses quantitative analysis to determine that the core alliance
systematically produces the dominant strategy. Seven statistical tests
probe the theory's causal foundations and mechanisms, providing reinforcing
support for the book's argument. The dominant strategy is statistically
linked to social proof and validation, credibility concerns, international
norms, and legitimacy.
4Great Powers and Strategic Constraints: The Bismarckian Era, 1873-1890
chapter abstract
The book's first case study demonstrates how the dominant strategy
constrains even the great powers' alliance choices. It explores the core
European pacts between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia from 1873-1890.
These countries repeatedly established alliances to solidify their security
relations, and they repeatedly failed. Austria-Hungary prevented Germany
from displacing it from the heart of Berlin's alliance strategy.
Consequently, these three conservative empires were unable to manage deep,
intra-allied disputes. Network constraints prevented the fluid,
transactional balancing strategies, contributing to World War I's onset.
5Cold War Credibility: NATO, SEATO, and CENTO, 1949-1965
chapter abstract
The second case highlights how Middle East and Southeast Asian countries
pushed the United States to create NATO-like security institutions in their
regions early in the Cold War. These countries evaluated American
reliability based on alliance emulation: only strategies matching NATO's
design signaled commitment. Washington's refusal to adopt the Atlantic
Alliance's strategy in other alliances undermined efforts to demonstrate
resolve and consolidate power against the Soviet Union.
6Diffusion to the Periphery: Security Cooperation in Southern Africa,
1992-2004
chapter abstract
The final case details the role of alliance construction in southern
Africa's status-building policy following the Cold War. Suddenly bereft of
superpower patronage, these countries viewed NATO and Europe more broadly
as the most effective strategy to foster military security and economic
development in their region. But southern Africa was politically unsuited
to such a strategy, leading states to seize alliance leadership to advance
their own unilateral policies. These countries nevertheless continued to
model NATO to legitimate their security strategy and foreign policy goals.
7The Dominant Strategy and Alliance Failure
chapter abstract
Copying the dominant strategy reduces the risk of alliance failure by
one-third. This chapter leverages statistical methods to link emulation to
security behavior. Military partnerships are more reliable and cohesive
when they converge on a single, socially accepted standard of credible and
legitimate cooperation. Scholars often assume that institutionalization
enhances reliability. This chapter demonstrates that such assumption is
only true when the core alliance is itself institutionalized. If not,
formal coordination can increase the risk of alliance failure by 26.46
percent.
8The Dominant Alliance Strategy: Policy Implications and Theoretical
Extensions
chapter abstract
This concluding chapter calls for a "NATO in Asia" as the only credible
demonstration of American commitment to the region against an assertive
China. It draws out policy implications from the theory for international
order, the feasibility and drawbacks of transactional foreign policies, and
major war.
1Transhistorical Patterns in Alliance Strategy
chapter abstract
Given the dangers of war, states should carefully tailor their alliances to
specific threats and constraints. We expect wide variety in security
strategies and pact designs. This expectation is wrong. In any year, 75
percent of states pursue identical alliance strategies. Why do countries
ignore their individuated conditions and converge on a single dominant
alliance strategy? This chapter presents the book's puzzle, describing
patterns in alliance design from 1715-2003.
2The Theory of Strategic Alliance Diffusion
chapter abstract
This chapter offers a social theory of diffusion to explain the dominant
alliance strategy. Major wars shatter the international system. Into this
breach, a new hegemon creates a core pact targeting its central security
challenge. This partnership becomes the standard for credible and
legitimate security policy in the postwar environment. Secondary countries
copy its strategy to demonstrate the credibility of their own alliances.
Peripheral nations emulate to acquire international status and prestige.
3The Diffusion of Alliance Strategy: Systemic Patterns and Evidence
chapter abstract
This chapter uses quantitative analysis to determine that the core alliance
systematically produces the dominant strategy. Seven statistical tests
probe the theory's causal foundations and mechanisms, providing reinforcing
support for the book's argument. The dominant strategy is statistically
linked to social proof and validation, credibility concerns, international
norms, and legitimacy.
4Great Powers and Strategic Constraints: The Bismarckian Era, 1873-1890
chapter abstract
The book's first case study demonstrates how the dominant strategy
constrains even the great powers' alliance choices. It explores the core
European pacts between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia from 1873-1890.
These countries repeatedly established alliances to solidify their security
relations, and they repeatedly failed. Austria-Hungary prevented Germany
from displacing it from the heart of Berlin's alliance strategy.
Consequently, these three conservative empires were unable to manage deep,
intra-allied disputes. Network constraints prevented the fluid,
transactional balancing strategies, contributing to World War I's onset.
5Cold War Credibility: NATO, SEATO, and CENTO, 1949-1965
chapter abstract
The second case highlights how Middle East and Southeast Asian countries
pushed the United States to create NATO-like security institutions in their
regions early in the Cold War. These countries evaluated American
reliability based on alliance emulation: only strategies matching NATO's
design signaled commitment. Washington's refusal to adopt the Atlantic
Alliance's strategy in other alliances undermined efforts to demonstrate
resolve and consolidate power against the Soviet Union.
6Diffusion to the Periphery: Security Cooperation in Southern Africa,
1992-2004
chapter abstract
The final case details the role of alliance construction in southern
Africa's status-building policy following the Cold War. Suddenly bereft of
superpower patronage, these countries viewed NATO and Europe more broadly
as the most effective strategy to foster military security and economic
development in their region. But southern Africa was politically unsuited
to such a strategy, leading states to seize alliance leadership to advance
their own unilateral policies. These countries nevertheless continued to
model NATO to legitimate their security strategy and foreign policy goals.
7The Dominant Strategy and Alliance Failure
chapter abstract
Copying the dominant strategy reduces the risk of alliance failure by
one-third. This chapter leverages statistical methods to link emulation to
security behavior. Military partnerships are more reliable and cohesive
when they converge on a single, socially accepted standard of credible and
legitimate cooperation. Scholars often assume that institutionalization
enhances reliability. This chapter demonstrates that such assumption is
only true when the core alliance is itself institutionalized. If not,
formal coordination can increase the risk of alliance failure by 26.46
percent.
8The Dominant Alliance Strategy: Policy Implications and Theoretical
Extensions
chapter abstract
This concluding chapter calls for a "NATO in Asia" as the only credible
demonstration of American commitment to the region against an assertive
China. It draws out policy implications from the theory for international
order, the feasibility and drawbacks of transactional foreign policies, and
major war.
Contents and Abstracts
1Transhistorical Patterns in Alliance Strategy
chapter abstract
Given the dangers of war, states should carefully tailor their alliances to
specific threats and constraints. We expect wide variety in security
strategies and pact designs. This expectation is wrong. In any year, 75
percent of states pursue identical alliance strategies. Why do countries
ignore their individuated conditions and converge on a single dominant
alliance strategy? This chapter presents the book's puzzle, describing
patterns in alliance design from 1715-2003.
2The Theory of Strategic Alliance Diffusion
chapter abstract
This chapter offers a social theory of diffusion to explain the dominant
alliance strategy. Major wars shatter the international system. Into this
breach, a new hegemon creates a core pact targeting its central security
challenge. This partnership becomes the standard for credible and
legitimate security policy in the postwar environment. Secondary countries
copy its strategy to demonstrate the credibility of their own alliances.
Peripheral nations emulate to acquire international status and prestige.
3The Diffusion of Alliance Strategy: Systemic Patterns and Evidence
chapter abstract
This chapter uses quantitative analysis to determine that the core alliance
systematically produces the dominant strategy. Seven statistical tests
probe the theory's causal foundations and mechanisms, providing reinforcing
support for the book's argument. The dominant strategy is statistically
linked to social proof and validation, credibility concerns, international
norms, and legitimacy.
4Great Powers and Strategic Constraints: The Bismarckian Era, 1873-1890
chapter abstract
The book's first case study demonstrates how the dominant strategy
constrains even the great powers' alliance choices. It explores the core
European pacts between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia from 1873-1890.
These countries repeatedly established alliances to solidify their security
relations, and they repeatedly failed. Austria-Hungary prevented Germany
from displacing it from the heart of Berlin's alliance strategy.
Consequently, these three conservative empires were unable to manage deep,
intra-allied disputes. Network constraints prevented the fluid,
transactional balancing strategies, contributing to World War I's onset.
5Cold War Credibility: NATO, SEATO, and CENTO, 1949-1965
chapter abstract
The second case highlights how Middle East and Southeast Asian countries
pushed the United States to create NATO-like security institutions in their
regions early in the Cold War. These countries evaluated American
reliability based on alliance emulation: only strategies matching NATO's
design signaled commitment. Washington's refusal to adopt the Atlantic
Alliance's strategy in other alliances undermined efforts to demonstrate
resolve and consolidate power against the Soviet Union.
6Diffusion to the Periphery: Security Cooperation in Southern Africa,
1992-2004
chapter abstract
The final case details the role of alliance construction in southern
Africa's status-building policy following the Cold War. Suddenly bereft of
superpower patronage, these countries viewed NATO and Europe more broadly
as the most effective strategy to foster military security and economic
development in their region. But southern Africa was politically unsuited
to such a strategy, leading states to seize alliance leadership to advance
their own unilateral policies. These countries nevertheless continued to
model NATO to legitimate their security strategy and foreign policy goals.
7The Dominant Strategy and Alliance Failure
chapter abstract
Copying the dominant strategy reduces the risk of alliance failure by
one-third. This chapter leverages statistical methods to link emulation to
security behavior. Military partnerships are more reliable and cohesive
when they converge on a single, socially accepted standard of credible and
legitimate cooperation. Scholars often assume that institutionalization
enhances reliability. This chapter demonstrates that such assumption is
only true when the core alliance is itself institutionalized. If not,
formal coordination can increase the risk of alliance failure by 26.46
percent.
8The Dominant Alliance Strategy: Policy Implications and Theoretical
Extensions
chapter abstract
This concluding chapter calls for a "NATO in Asia" as the only credible
demonstration of American commitment to the region against an assertive
China. It draws out policy implications from the theory for international
order, the feasibility and drawbacks of transactional foreign policies, and
major war.
1Transhistorical Patterns in Alliance Strategy
chapter abstract
Given the dangers of war, states should carefully tailor their alliances to
specific threats and constraints. We expect wide variety in security
strategies and pact designs. This expectation is wrong. In any year, 75
percent of states pursue identical alliance strategies. Why do countries
ignore their individuated conditions and converge on a single dominant
alliance strategy? This chapter presents the book's puzzle, describing
patterns in alliance design from 1715-2003.
2The Theory of Strategic Alliance Diffusion
chapter abstract
This chapter offers a social theory of diffusion to explain the dominant
alliance strategy. Major wars shatter the international system. Into this
breach, a new hegemon creates a core pact targeting its central security
challenge. This partnership becomes the standard for credible and
legitimate security policy in the postwar environment. Secondary countries
copy its strategy to demonstrate the credibility of their own alliances.
Peripheral nations emulate to acquire international status and prestige.
3The Diffusion of Alliance Strategy: Systemic Patterns and Evidence
chapter abstract
This chapter uses quantitative analysis to determine that the core alliance
systematically produces the dominant strategy. Seven statistical tests
probe the theory's causal foundations and mechanisms, providing reinforcing
support for the book's argument. The dominant strategy is statistically
linked to social proof and validation, credibility concerns, international
norms, and legitimacy.
4Great Powers and Strategic Constraints: The Bismarckian Era, 1873-1890
chapter abstract
The book's first case study demonstrates how the dominant strategy
constrains even the great powers' alliance choices. It explores the core
European pacts between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia from 1873-1890.
These countries repeatedly established alliances to solidify their security
relations, and they repeatedly failed. Austria-Hungary prevented Germany
from displacing it from the heart of Berlin's alliance strategy.
Consequently, these three conservative empires were unable to manage deep,
intra-allied disputes. Network constraints prevented the fluid,
transactional balancing strategies, contributing to World War I's onset.
5Cold War Credibility: NATO, SEATO, and CENTO, 1949-1965
chapter abstract
The second case highlights how Middle East and Southeast Asian countries
pushed the United States to create NATO-like security institutions in their
regions early in the Cold War. These countries evaluated American
reliability based on alliance emulation: only strategies matching NATO's
design signaled commitment. Washington's refusal to adopt the Atlantic
Alliance's strategy in other alliances undermined efforts to demonstrate
resolve and consolidate power against the Soviet Union.
6Diffusion to the Periphery: Security Cooperation in Southern Africa,
1992-2004
chapter abstract
The final case details the role of alliance construction in southern
Africa's status-building policy following the Cold War. Suddenly bereft of
superpower patronage, these countries viewed NATO and Europe more broadly
as the most effective strategy to foster military security and economic
development in their region. But southern Africa was politically unsuited
to such a strategy, leading states to seize alliance leadership to advance
their own unilateral policies. These countries nevertheless continued to
model NATO to legitimate their security strategy and foreign policy goals.
7The Dominant Strategy and Alliance Failure
chapter abstract
Copying the dominant strategy reduces the risk of alliance failure by
one-third. This chapter leverages statistical methods to link emulation to
security behavior. Military partnerships are more reliable and cohesive
when they converge on a single, socially accepted standard of credible and
legitimate cooperation. Scholars often assume that institutionalization
enhances reliability. This chapter demonstrates that such assumption is
only true when the core alliance is itself institutionalized. If not,
formal coordination can increase the risk of alliance failure by 26.46
percent.
8The Dominant Alliance Strategy: Policy Implications and Theoretical
Extensions
chapter abstract
This concluding chapter calls for a "NATO in Asia" as the only credible
demonstration of American commitment to the region against an assertive
China. It draws out policy implications from the theory for international
order, the feasibility and drawbacks of transactional foreign policies, and
major war.