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In the fifteen years since the formation of Special Operations Command, the Special Operations Forces communities of all services have strongly emphasized the integration of their combat capabilities. However, Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) have not put this same degree of effort into integration of combat capabilities with the rest of the United States Air Force. Consequently, AFSOF are experts at the joint tactical fight but are less proficient at integrating into larger conventional air operations. The deficiency is most evident when SOF air forces must work within the command and control system of theater air forces. This study addresses the issue and proposes measures to enhance the coordination between Special Operations air forces and conventional air forces in theater operations. The history of this issue is examined through three case studies: the 1st Air Commando Group and Operation Thursday, The Son Tay Raid, and SOF command and control in Desert Storm. From these case studies, three main lessons stand out as applicable to the issues facing the SOF air component today: (1) SOF must integrate their operations into the larger set of theater operations; (2) SOF air assets should be centrally controlled by the theater SOF component; (3) SOF cannot plan missions in a vacuum.