Tímea Drinóczi, Bie &
Illiberal Constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary
The Deterioration of Democracy, Misuse of Human Rights and Abuse of the Rule of Law
Tímea Drinóczi, Bie &
Illiberal Constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary
The Deterioration of Democracy, Misuse of Human Rights and Abuse of the Rule of Law
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This book theorizes illiberal constitutionalism by interrogation of the Rule of Law, democratic deterioration, and the misuse of the language and relativization of human rights protection, and its widespread emotional and value-oriented effect on the population.
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This book theorizes illiberal constitutionalism by interrogation of the Rule of Law, democratic deterioration, and the misuse of the language and relativization of human rights protection, and its widespread emotional and value-oriented effect on the population.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Routledge
- Seitenzahl: 224
- Erscheinungstermin: 31. Mai 2023
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 13mm
- Gewicht: 340g
- ISBN-13: 9781032007366
- ISBN-10: 1032007362
- Artikelnr.: 67826137
- Verlag: Routledge
- Seitenzahl: 224
- Erscheinungstermin: 31. Mai 2023
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 13mm
- Gewicht: 340g
- ISBN-13: 9781032007366
- ISBN-10: 1032007362
- Artikelnr.: 67826137
Tímea Drinóczi is Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Law at Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil. Since 2017, she has also been a Doctor of the Academy of Sciences of Hungary. Professor Drinóczi has been a visiting professor in law schools in Plzen, Brno, Cologne, Graz, Istanbul, and Osijek, and has presented papers at several conferences all over Europe, in Hong Kong, Nanjing, Seoul, and Santiago. She served as a professor at the University of Pécs, Faculty of Law, Hungary, and Kenyatta University School of Law, Nairobi, Kenya. Agnieszka Bie¿-Kaca¿a is Professor within the Department of Constitutional Law, Faculty of Law and Administration at Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toru¿, Poland. Professor Bie¿-Kacäa has been a visiting professor in law schools in Athens, Prague, and Maastricht. Together, Professors Drinóczi and Bie¿-Kacäa have presented papers at several conferences all over Europe, and in Hong Kong and Santiago de Chile.
Part I. Introduction - Ambitions and Comparison
I. Ambitions
II. Why Hungary and Poland
III. Insight into the book
Part II. Terms - Constitutionalism, illiberal(ism), and constitutional
democracy
I. Constitutionalism in the term "illiberal constitutionalism"
II. Illiberal(ism)
III. Constitutional democracy
Part III. Identity - Unbalanced constitutional identity: emotions and
values
I. Historical and emotional trajectory
II. Post-communist past and beyond
III. Possible root cause: the combination of the above
Part IV. Limits - Comparative perspective
I. The Emergence of llliberal Constitutionalism
II. A comparative perspective - looking for constraints
III. Contextualization: the European Rule of Law as a constraint on public
power
Part V. Limits - Constraints in constitutional design and identity
I. Illiberal legality
II. Illiberal Democracy
III. Illiberalization of Human Rights
Part VI. Stability - How "illiberal limits" emerge and work
I. Capturing constitutions and constitutionalism, and creating invisible
constitution
II. Illiberal judicialization of politics
III. Pushing the limits and bouncing back
IV. Defeating exit strategies from the hollowed-out constitutional
democracy
Part VI. Conclusions
1. Constitutionalism does not necessarily have to be liberal
2. Illiberal constitutionalism is a deterioration from liberal
constitutionalism towards authoritarianism but has not reached that point
yet
3. In an illiberal constitutional identity, the liberal and non-liberal or
illiberal value orientation of the population can intermittently prevail
4. Illiberal constitutionalism is a coherent theory in its illiberal and
weakly constrained manner
5. Lessons learned, mostly, for others ...
I. Ambitions
II. Why Hungary and Poland
III. Insight into the book
Part II. Terms - Constitutionalism, illiberal(ism), and constitutional
democracy
I. Constitutionalism in the term "illiberal constitutionalism"
II. Illiberal(ism)
III. Constitutional democracy
Part III. Identity - Unbalanced constitutional identity: emotions and
values
I. Historical and emotional trajectory
II. Post-communist past and beyond
III. Possible root cause: the combination of the above
Part IV. Limits - Comparative perspective
I. The Emergence of llliberal Constitutionalism
II. A comparative perspective - looking for constraints
III. Contextualization: the European Rule of Law as a constraint on public
power
Part V. Limits - Constraints in constitutional design and identity
I. Illiberal legality
II. Illiberal Democracy
III. Illiberalization of Human Rights
Part VI. Stability - How "illiberal limits" emerge and work
I. Capturing constitutions and constitutionalism, and creating invisible
constitution
II. Illiberal judicialization of politics
III. Pushing the limits and bouncing back
IV. Defeating exit strategies from the hollowed-out constitutional
democracy
Part VI. Conclusions
1. Constitutionalism does not necessarily have to be liberal
2. Illiberal constitutionalism is a deterioration from liberal
constitutionalism towards authoritarianism but has not reached that point
yet
3. In an illiberal constitutional identity, the liberal and non-liberal or
illiberal value orientation of the population can intermittently prevail
4. Illiberal constitutionalism is a coherent theory in its illiberal and
weakly constrained manner
5. Lessons learned, mostly, for others ...
Part I. Introduction - Ambitions and Comparison
I. Ambitions
II. Why Hungary and Poland
III. Insight into the book
Part II. Terms - Constitutionalism, illiberal(ism), and constitutional
democracy
I. Constitutionalism in the term "illiberal constitutionalism"
II. Illiberal(ism)
III. Constitutional democracy
Part III. Identity - Unbalanced constitutional identity: emotions and
values
I. Historical and emotional trajectory
II. Post-communist past and beyond
III. Possible root cause: the combination of the above
Part IV. Limits - Comparative perspective
I. The Emergence of llliberal Constitutionalism
II. A comparative perspective - looking for constraints
III. Contextualization: the European Rule of Law as a constraint on public
power
Part V. Limits - Constraints in constitutional design and identity
I. Illiberal legality
II. Illiberal Democracy
III. Illiberalization of Human Rights
Part VI. Stability - How "illiberal limits" emerge and work
I. Capturing constitutions and constitutionalism, and creating invisible
constitution
II. Illiberal judicialization of politics
III. Pushing the limits and bouncing back
IV. Defeating exit strategies from the hollowed-out constitutional
democracy
Part VI. Conclusions
1. Constitutionalism does not necessarily have to be liberal
2. Illiberal constitutionalism is a deterioration from liberal
constitutionalism towards authoritarianism but has not reached that point
yet
3. In an illiberal constitutional identity, the liberal and non-liberal or
illiberal value orientation of the population can intermittently prevail
4. Illiberal constitutionalism is a coherent theory in its illiberal and
weakly constrained manner
5. Lessons learned, mostly, for others ...
I. Ambitions
II. Why Hungary and Poland
III. Insight into the book
Part II. Terms - Constitutionalism, illiberal(ism), and constitutional
democracy
I. Constitutionalism in the term "illiberal constitutionalism"
II. Illiberal(ism)
III. Constitutional democracy
Part III. Identity - Unbalanced constitutional identity: emotions and
values
I. Historical and emotional trajectory
II. Post-communist past and beyond
III. Possible root cause: the combination of the above
Part IV. Limits - Comparative perspective
I. The Emergence of llliberal Constitutionalism
II. A comparative perspective - looking for constraints
III. Contextualization: the European Rule of Law as a constraint on public
power
Part V. Limits - Constraints in constitutional design and identity
I. Illiberal legality
II. Illiberal Democracy
III. Illiberalization of Human Rights
Part VI. Stability - How "illiberal limits" emerge and work
I. Capturing constitutions and constitutionalism, and creating invisible
constitution
II. Illiberal judicialization of politics
III. Pushing the limits and bouncing back
IV. Defeating exit strategies from the hollowed-out constitutional
democracy
Part VI. Conclusions
1. Constitutionalism does not necessarily have to be liberal
2. Illiberal constitutionalism is a deterioration from liberal
constitutionalism towards authoritarianism but has not reached that point
yet
3. In an illiberal constitutional identity, the liberal and non-liberal or
illiberal value orientation of the population can intermittently prevail
4. Illiberal constitutionalism is a coherent theory in its illiberal and
weakly constrained manner
5. Lessons learned, mostly, for others ...