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Tal Becker's incisive and ground-breaking book analyses the law of State responsibility for non-State violence and examines its relevance in a world coming to terms with the threat of catastrophic terrorism.
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Tal Becker's incisive and ground-breaking book analyses the law of State responsibility for non-State violence and examines its relevance in a world coming to terms with the threat of catastrophic terrorism.
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Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Hart Publishing
- Seitenzahl: 404
- Erscheinungstermin: 23. März 2006
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 240mm x 161mm x 26mm
- Gewicht: 786g
- ISBN-13: 9781841136066
- ISBN-10: 1841136069
- Artikelnr.: 22757403
- Verlag: Hart Publishing
- Seitenzahl: 404
- Erscheinungstermin: 23. März 2006
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 240mm x 161mm x 26mm
- Gewicht: 786g
- ISBN-13: 9781841136066
- ISBN-10: 1841136069
- Artikelnr.: 22757403
Tal Becker
1. Introduction 1.1 Terrorism and the State 1.2 The Law of State
Responsibility for Private Acts 1.3 The Challenge of September 11th 1.4
Overview of Research Part I: State Responsibility for Private Acts: Theory
and Practice 2. State Responsibility for Private Acts: The Evolution of a
Doctrine 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The Origin of State Responsibility and the
General Principle of Non-Attribution of Private Acts 2.3 The Doctrine of
Collective Responsibility 2.4 The Theory of Complicity 2.5 The Janes Case
2.6 The Condonation Theory and the Calculation of Damage 2.7 The Separate
Delict Theory 2.8 The Presentation of the Separate Delict Theory to the ILC
2.9 Conclusion 3. The Agency Paradigm: The Principle of Non-Attribution and
its Exceptions 3.1 The Principle of Non-Attribution of Private Acts and the
Separate Delict Theory: The ILC Text and the Claim of Universal
Application. 3.2 Recent Applications of the Separate Delict Theory 3.3 The
Exceptions 3.4 Conclusion Part II State Responsibility for Private Acts of
Terrorism: Conventional Perspectives 4. To Prevent and to Abstain:
International Obligations of States with Respect to Terrorism 4.1
Introduction 4.2 Towards a Definition of Terrorism 4.3 Counter-Terrorism
Obligations of the State: The Duty to Prevent and to Abstain 4.4 The
Standard of Care and the Burden of Proof: Determining State Responsibility
for Violations of Counter-Terrorism Obligations 4.5 Conclusion 5. State
Responsibility for Private Acts of Terrorism 5.1 A Distinction with a
Difference 5.2 State Resonsibility for Private Acts of Terrorism before
September 11: Three Theories 5.3 Use of Force as Lex Specialis 5.4 State
Practice before September 11th 5.5 Conclusion 6. The Challenge of September
11th and the Academic Response 6.1 September 11th and the International
Reaction 6.2 The Academic Response 6.3 Conclusion: The Dissonance between
Theory and Practice 7. Inadequacies of Existing Approaches to State
Responsibility for Terrorism 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Contemporary Forms of
State Involvement in Terrorism 7.3 The Inadequacies of the Agency Paradigm
7.4 The Inadequacies of Use of Force Standards 7.5 The Inadequacies of
Absolute or Strict Responsibility 7.6 Towards a Model of State
Responsibility for Terrorism: The Inter-penetration of the Public and
Private Sphere 7.7 Conclusion Part III: State Responsibility for Terrorism:
A Causal Analysis 8. Causation-based Responsibility 8.1 Introduction:
Agency and Causation 8.2 A Word about Private Law Analogies 8.3 Common
Sense Causation: Some Basic Principles 8.4 Echoes of Causation-based
Responsibility in International Law 8.5 Conclusion 9.Causation-based State
Responsibility for Terrorism 9.1 Introduction 9.2 A Causal Model of State
Responsibility for Terrorism: Applying a Four-step Process 9.3 Returning to
the Problem of Burden of Proof 9.4 Testing the Practical Viability of a
Causal Model 9.5 Conclusion: The Policy Benefits of a Causal Model and its
Status under International Law
Responsibility for Private Acts 1.3 The Challenge of September 11th 1.4
Overview of Research Part I: State Responsibility for Private Acts: Theory
and Practice 2. State Responsibility for Private Acts: The Evolution of a
Doctrine 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The Origin of State Responsibility and the
General Principle of Non-Attribution of Private Acts 2.3 The Doctrine of
Collective Responsibility 2.4 The Theory of Complicity 2.5 The Janes Case
2.6 The Condonation Theory and the Calculation of Damage 2.7 The Separate
Delict Theory 2.8 The Presentation of the Separate Delict Theory to the ILC
2.9 Conclusion 3. The Agency Paradigm: The Principle of Non-Attribution and
its Exceptions 3.1 The Principle of Non-Attribution of Private Acts and the
Separate Delict Theory: The ILC Text and the Claim of Universal
Application. 3.2 Recent Applications of the Separate Delict Theory 3.3 The
Exceptions 3.4 Conclusion Part II State Responsibility for Private Acts of
Terrorism: Conventional Perspectives 4. To Prevent and to Abstain:
International Obligations of States with Respect to Terrorism 4.1
Introduction 4.2 Towards a Definition of Terrorism 4.3 Counter-Terrorism
Obligations of the State: The Duty to Prevent and to Abstain 4.4 The
Standard of Care and the Burden of Proof: Determining State Responsibility
for Violations of Counter-Terrorism Obligations 4.5 Conclusion 5. State
Responsibility for Private Acts of Terrorism 5.1 A Distinction with a
Difference 5.2 State Resonsibility for Private Acts of Terrorism before
September 11: Three Theories 5.3 Use of Force as Lex Specialis 5.4 State
Practice before September 11th 5.5 Conclusion 6. The Challenge of September
11th and the Academic Response 6.1 September 11th and the International
Reaction 6.2 The Academic Response 6.3 Conclusion: The Dissonance between
Theory and Practice 7. Inadequacies of Existing Approaches to State
Responsibility for Terrorism 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Contemporary Forms of
State Involvement in Terrorism 7.3 The Inadequacies of the Agency Paradigm
7.4 The Inadequacies of Use of Force Standards 7.5 The Inadequacies of
Absolute or Strict Responsibility 7.6 Towards a Model of State
Responsibility for Terrorism: The Inter-penetration of the Public and
Private Sphere 7.7 Conclusion Part III: State Responsibility for Terrorism:
A Causal Analysis 8. Causation-based Responsibility 8.1 Introduction:
Agency and Causation 8.2 A Word about Private Law Analogies 8.3 Common
Sense Causation: Some Basic Principles 8.4 Echoes of Causation-based
Responsibility in International Law 8.5 Conclusion 9.Causation-based State
Responsibility for Terrorism 9.1 Introduction 9.2 A Causal Model of State
Responsibility for Terrorism: Applying a Four-step Process 9.3 Returning to
the Problem of Burden of Proof 9.4 Testing the Practical Viability of a
Causal Model 9.5 Conclusion: The Policy Benefits of a Causal Model and its
Status under International Law
1. Introduction 1.1 Terrorism and the State 1.2 The Law of State
Responsibility for Private Acts 1.3 The Challenge of September 11th 1.4
Overview of Research Part I: State Responsibility for Private Acts: Theory
and Practice 2. State Responsibility for Private Acts: The Evolution of a
Doctrine 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The Origin of State Responsibility and the
General Principle of Non-Attribution of Private Acts 2.3 The Doctrine of
Collective Responsibility 2.4 The Theory of Complicity 2.5 The Janes Case
2.6 The Condonation Theory and the Calculation of Damage 2.7 The Separate
Delict Theory 2.8 The Presentation of the Separate Delict Theory to the ILC
2.9 Conclusion 3. The Agency Paradigm: The Principle of Non-Attribution and
its Exceptions 3.1 The Principle of Non-Attribution of Private Acts and the
Separate Delict Theory: The ILC Text and the Claim of Universal
Application. 3.2 Recent Applications of the Separate Delict Theory 3.3 The
Exceptions 3.4 Conclusion Part II State Responsibility for Private Acts of
Terrorism: Conventional Perspectives 4. To Prevent and to Abstain:
International Obligations of States with Respect to Terrorism 4.1
Introduction 4.2 Towards a Definition of Terrorism 4.3 Counter-Terrorism
Obligations of the State: The Duty to Prevent and to Abstain 4.4 The
Standard of Care and the Burden of Proof: Determining State Responsibility
for Violations of Counter-Terrorism Obligations 4.5 Conclusion 5. State
Responsibility for Private Acts of Terrorism 5.1 A Distinction with a
Difference 5.2 State Resonsibility for Private Acts of Terrorism before
September 11: Three Theories 5.3 Use of Force as Lex Specialis 5.4 State
Practice before September 11th 5.5 Conclusion 6. The Challenge of September
11th and the Academic Response 6.1 September 11th and the International
Reaction 6.2 The Academic Response 6.3 Conclusion: The Dissonance between
Theory and Practice 7. Inadequacies of Existing Approaches to State
Responsibility for Terrorism 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Contemporary Forms of
State Involvement in Terrorism 7.3 The Inadequacies of the Agency Paradigm
7.4 The Inadequacies of Use of Force Standards 7.5 The Inadequacies of
Absolute or Strict Responsibility 7.6 Towards a Model of State
Responsibility for Terrorism: The Inter-penetration of the Public and
Private Sphere 7.7 Conclusion Part III: State Responsibility for Terrorism:
A Causal Analysis 8. Causation-based Responsibility 8.1 Introduction:
Agency and Causation 8.2 A Word about Private Law Analogies 8.3 Common
Sense Causation: Some Basic Principles 8.4 Echoes of Causation-based
Responsibility in International Law 8.5 Conclusion 9.Causation-based State
Responsibility for Terrorism 9.1 Introduction 9.2 A Causal Model of State
Responsibility for Terrorism: Applying a Four-step Process 9.3 Returning to
the Problem of Burden of Proof 9.4 Testing the Practical Viability of a
Causal Model 9.5 Conclusion: The Policy Benefits of a Causal Model and its
Status under International Law
Responsibility for Private Acts 1.3 The Challenge of September 11th 1.4
Overview of Research Part I: State Responsibility for Private Acts: Theory
and Practice 2. State Responsibility for Private Acts: The Evolution of a
Doctrine 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The Origin of State Responsibility and the
General Principle of Non-Attribution of Private Acts 2.3 The Doctrine of
Collective Responsibility 2.4 The Theory of Complicity 2.5 The Janes Case
2.6 The Condonation Theory and the Calculation of Damage 2.7 The Separate
Delict Theory 2.8 The Presentation of the Separate Delict Theory to the ILC
2.9 Conclusion 3. The Agency Paradigm: The Principle of Non-Attribution and
its Exceptions 3.1 The Principle of Non-Attribution of Private Acts and the
Separate Delict Theory: The ILC Text and the Claim of Universal
Application. 3.2 Recent Applications of the Separate Delict Theory 3.3 The
Exceptions 3.4 Conclusion Part II State Responsibility for Private Acts of
Terrorism: Conventional Perspectives 4. To Prevent and to Abstain:
International Obligations of States with Respect to Terrorism 4.1
Introduction 4.2 Towards a Definition of Terrorism 4.3 Counter-Terrorism
Obligations of the State: The Duty to Prevent and to Abstain 4.4 The
Standard of Care and the Burden of Proof: Determining State Responsibility
for Violations of Counter-Terrorism Obligations 4.5 Conclusion 5. State
Responsibility for Private Acts of Terrorism 5.1 A Distinction with a
Difference 5.2 State Resonsibility for Private Acts of Terrorism before
September 11: Three Theories 5.3 Use of Force as Lex Specialis 5.4 State
Practice before September 11th 5.5 Conclusion 6. The Challenge of September
11th and the Academic Response 6.1 September 11th and the International
Reaction 6.2 The Academic Response 6.3 Conclusion: The Dissonance between
Theory and Practice 7. Inadequacies of Existing Approaches to State
Responsibility for Terrorism 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Contemporary Forms of
State Involvement in Terrorism 7.3 The Inadequacies of the Agency Paradigm
7.4 The Inadequacies of Use of Force Standards 7.5 The Inadequacies of
Absolute or Strict Responsibility 7.6 Towards a Model of State
Responsibility for Terrorism: The Inter-penetration of the Public and
Private Sphere 7.7 Conclusion Part III: State Responsibility for Terrorism:
A Causal Analysis 8. Causation-based Responsibility 8.1 Introduction:
Agency and Causation 8.2 A Word about Private Law Analogies 8.3 Common
Sense Causation: Some Basic Principles 8.4 Echoes of Causation-based
Responsibility in International Law 8.5 Conclusion 9.Causation-based State
Responsibility for Terrorism 9.1 Introduction 9.2 A Causal Model of State
Responsibility for Terrorism: Applying a Four-step Process 9.3 Returning to
the Problem of Burden of Proof 9.4 Testing the Practical Viability of a
Causal Model 9.5 Conclusion: The Policy Benefits of a Causal Model and its
Status under International Law