Tyrone L Groh

Proxy War

The Least Bad Option

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

The U.S. has indirectly intervened in international conflicts on a relatively large scale for decades. Yet little is known about the immediate usefulness or long-term effectiveness of contemporary proxy warfare. In cases when neither direct involvement nor total disengagement are viable, proxy warfare is often the best option, or, rather, the least bad option. Tyrone L. Groh describes the hazards and undesirable aspects of this strategy, as well as how to deploy it effectively. Proxy War explores the circumstances under which indirect warfare works best, how to evaluate it as a policy option, and the possible risks and rewards. Groh offers a fresh look at this strategy, using uncommon and understudied cases to test the concepts presented. These ten case studies investigate and illustrate the different types and uses of proxy war under varying conditions. What arises is a complete theoretical model of proxy warfare that can be applied to a wide range of situations. Proxy war is here to stay and will likely become more common as players on the international stage increasingly challenge U.S. dominance, making it more important than ever to understand how and when to deploy it.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 264
• Erscheinungstermin: 26. März 2019
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 231mm x 155mm x 23mm
• Gewicht: 544g
• ISBN-13: 9781503608184
• ISBN-10: 1503608182
• Artikelnr.: 53541591

Autorenporträt

Tyrone L. Groh is Associate Professor of Global Security and Intelligence at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and a decorated U.S. Air Force officer.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents and Abstracts
1Introduction
chapter abstract
This chapter introduces the book and focuses on the need for a pragmatic
yet rigorous study on proxy war. The chapter explains how the term proxy
war carries a lot of baggage and how its usefulness has been overblown,
largely due to Cold War influences that continue to dominate the
contemporary view of indirect interventions involving a third party to
influence civil affairs abroad. This view is antiquated and dangerous.
Using proxy war as a means of indirect intervention requires considering
both the policy's utility-a short-term view that determines if a proxy can
provide the ability to intervene-and the efficacy-a long-term view that
evaluates the likelihood that supporting the chosen proxy can produce a
desirable outcome. Proxy war offers an opportunity to help manage some of
the uncertainty associated with indirect intervention, but is rarely a
low-cost policy and it is never risk free.
2Sharpening the Definitions of Indirect Intervention and Proxy War
chapter abstract
In this chapter, the book proposes four general categories that represent
the barriers that lead states to choose indirect intervention: (1) the risk
of escalation, (2) a lack of domestic support, (3) a lack of international
support, and (4) a lack of capacity. Facing these restrictions, states must
decide how much control they desire over the outcome when intervening
indirectly. Further, the chapter suggests that proxy war is only one means
of indirectly intervening in the affairs of another state and can be broken
down into two general types: donated assistance and proxy war. Lastly, the
chapter offers a new typology for proxy war (in it to win it, holding
action, meddling, and feeding the chaos) and explains how the different
types fit into a state's policy to intervene in the affairs of another
state.
3The Evolution of Proxy War Since 1945
chapter abstract
In this chapter, the book explains how war has a way of confounding policy.
Barriers influence a state's decision to intervene in the affairs of
another state, but the nature and interpretation of those barriers change
as the structure of the world order changes. The need for proxy
intervention remains, but the conditions under which it operates have
changed. Looking at the changes from a systemic perspective offers some
interesting insights. To this end, this chapter asks three questions: (1)
How does the order of the international system influence the use of proxy
war? (2) How does a state's position in that order influence its use of
proxy war? (3) How does a state's perception of the barriers affect the
choice to engage in proxy war? Looking at these questions leads to a model
that describes, and potentially predicts, the conditions under which a
state will resort to proxy war.
4A Theory of Proxy War
chapter abstract
This chapter presents a theory of how to conduct proxy war in a way that
maximizes such a policy's utility and efficacy. Regardless of how well the
proxy appears to fit the need, the reliance on another to pursue interests
and objectives means that the intervening state must prepare for the
additional costs and challenges associated with working through a third
party. This chapter explores how certain conditions and methods lead to
maximizing a proxy's utility and efficacy. Utility refers to the idea that
a proxy can do what is needed-that it can perform the tasks necessary to
carry out the intervention. Efficacy describes the proxy's ability to
enable the intervening state to accomplish its desired objectives.
Therefore, efficacy represents the long-term perspective.
5America's Proxy War in Laos
chapter abstract
This chapter presents a case study for how the United States failed to
persuade the Royal Lao Government to commit to counterinsurgency efforts
against the communist Pathet Lao and therefore cultivated an indigenous
proxy in the Hmong. International conditions did not support U.S.
involvement at any level, yet the United States gained significant benefits
from the arrangement with comparatively small costs. This case represents
one of the rare instances when an intervening state supports a proxy that
is essentially unaffiliated with the sitting government. Although the Hmong
had already begun to band together to fight the North Vietnamese and Pathet
Lao, it was not until the United States got involved that the Hmong became
an influential factor in the Laotian conflict.
6South Africa's Proxy War in Angola
chapter abstract
This chapter presents a case study for how South Africa used UNITA as a
proxy to intervene in the tense civil war in Angola to protect itself from
communist influence. Pretoria wanted to prevent the African National
Congress from taking over South Africa by force and to minimize Soviet
influence in the region. UNITA received relatively overt support, operated
with a high degree of autonomy, and had highly divergent objectives.
Although the international community rhetorically opposed South Africa's
involvement in Angola, the actions of the United States and Western Europe
reflected a more tacit approval. Domestically, South Africa's public was
reluctantly supportive but only on the condition that the costs remain low.
Considering that most states had already rhetorically condemned Pretoria's
government and its foreign policy in southern Africa, it is interesting
that states failed to raise the international costs of South Africa's
indirect intervention in Angola.
7India's Proxy War in Sri Lanka
chapter abstract
This chapter presents a case study for how India initially supported the
LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) covertly to protect ethnic Tamils
in Sri Lanka and then later had to overtly intervene to stop LTTE's
operations during efforts to broker peace. For the duration of the
conflict, India's support remained covert and plausibly deniable. Inside
Sri Lanka, the character of the conflict was almost exclusively ethnic and
involved the government in Colombo trying to prevent the emergence of an
independent Tamil state. Internationally, the United States, the Soviet
Union, and most other global powers, for the most part, remained sidelined.
Domestically, India's government had to balance its foreign policy with
concerns about its sympathetic Tamil population and the threat of several
different secessionist movements inside its own borders. The India-LTTE
case reflects history's most costly proxy war policy.
8Conclusion
chapter abstract
This chapter summarizes the book's findings and concludes that the
twenty-first century and its associated advances in information sharing,
communication, and social media will not likely create a revolutionary
change in the utility and efficacy of proxy war. In the cases of Russia,
China, and the United States, intrastate conflicts on the periphery will
once again become proxy war hotbeds. Indirect intervention will most likely
follow a policy of donating assistance, meddling, or feeding the chaos in
states near their competitors. Although a multipolar world order means that
there are more states with global interests, the heightened competition in
key regions mean that gains can be made in areas that are less strategic.
Unfortunately, this probably means that Africa will experience an increase
in civil wars propagated and supported by third-party intervention.