Non-Propositional Intentionality
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This book explores how our minds represent things in the world, asking whether these representations necessarily have the structure of propositions about the world. The hope is that this will lead towards a more complete understanding of the puzzle of intentionality ¿ how it is that our minds make contact with the world.

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Produktbeschreibung
This book explores how our minds represent things in the world, asking whether these representations necessarily have the structure of propositions about the world. The hope is that this will lead towards a more complete understanding of the puzzle of intentionality ¿ how it is that our minds make contact with the world.
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Autorenporträt
Alex Grzankowski is a lecturer in the department of philosophy at Birkbeck, University of London, working primarily on the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. He has published a number of articles on issues concerning intentionality and representation. Before coming to the University of London, Alex taught and researched at the University of Cambridge and at Texas Tech University. He received his PhD in 2013 at the University of Texas at Austin. Michelle Montague is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Texas, Austin. Her work focuses on the philosophy of mind, primarily on consciousness and intentionality. In addition to publishing numerous articles in these areas, she is the author of The Given: Experience and its Content (Oxford University Press, 2016), the co-editor with Tim Bayne of Cognitive Phenomenology (Oxford University Press, 2011), and the co-editor with Galen Strawson of Philosophical Writings by P.F. Strawson (Oxford University Press, 2011).