• Preface


• Introduction


• PART ONE: A Selective Background


• 1: Chapter 1: Self-Reference and Tarski's Theorem


• 2: Validity and the Unprovability of Soundness


• 3: Kripke's Theory of Truth (Strong Kleene Version)


• 4: Adding a Conditional? Curry and Lukasiewicz


• 5: Interlude on Vagueness, and the Paradoxes of König and Berry


• PART TWO: Broadly Classical Approaches


• 6: Introduction to the broadly classical options


• 7: Truth-Value Gaps in Classical Theories


• 8: Truth-value Gluts in Classical Theories


• 9: A Second Interlude on Vagueness


• 10: Introduction to Supervaluational Approaches to Paradox


• 11: A Survey of Supervaluational and Revision-Rule Theories


• 12: Are Supervaluational and Revision Theories Self-Undermining?


• 13: Intersubstitutivity and the Purpose of Truth


• 14: Stratified and Contextual Theories


• Stratified and Contextual Theories


• 15: What Is To Be Done?


• 16: Fixed Points and Revision Rules for Conditionals


• 17: More on Revision-theoretic Conditionals


• 18: What Has Been Done


• PART FOUR: More on Paracomplete Solutions


• 19: Validity, Truth-Preservation and the Second Incompleteness Theorem


• 20: Other Paradoxes


• 21: Do Paracomplete Solutions Depend on Expressive Limitations?


• 22: Determinateness, Hyper-determinateness, Super-Determinateness and Revenge


• PART FIVE: Paraconsistent Dialetheism


• 23: An Introduction to Paraconsistent Dialetheism


• 24: Some Dialetheic Theories


• 25: Paraconsistent Dialetheism and Soundness


• 26: Hyper-determinacy and revenge


• Bibliography